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THE PROBLEM

Lastly, among the other obligations connected with war,
Cicero includes this: not to be excessively severe to the
conquered .... 1
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
12 AYALA, DE JURE ET OFFIcIIs BELLIcI ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI LIBRI
III, at 102 (Bate transl. 1912).
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Seeing that there is not less virtue in preserving what we
have gained than in acquiring it, and in the right use of victory than in victory itself-for as Ovid rightly says: Chance
controls the one, but in the other there is a need for skilland seeing that the object of war is to live in peace, our whole
thought, after the enemy has been crushed, should be by what
best means to restrain him forever from making war again.2
2 Id. at 163.
In 1823 Chief Justice Marshall came to thorny grip with
this problem in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
Speaking for the Court, the Chief Justice opined: "The plaintiffs in this
cause claim the land, in their declaration mentioned, under two grants, purporting to be made, the first in 1773, and the last in 1775, by the chiefs of
certain Indian tribes, constituting the Illinois and the Piankeshaw nations;
and the question is, whether this title can be recognized in the Courts of the

United States? ... " Id. at 571-72.

"Although we do not mean to engage in the defence of those principles
which Europeans have applied to Indian title, they may, we think, find some
excuse, if not justification, in the character and habits of the people whose
rights have been wrested from them. The title by conquest is acquired and
maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits. Humanity, however, acting on public opinion, has established, as a general rule, that the
conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their condition shall
remain as eligible as is compatible with the objects of the conquest. Most
usually, they are incorporated with the victorious nation, and become subjects or citizens of the government with which they are connected. The
new and old members of the society mingle with each other; the distinction
between them is gradually lost, and they make one people. Where this
incorporation is practicable, humanity demands, and a wise policy requires,
that the rights of the conquered to property should remain unimpaired; that
the new subjects should be governed as equitably as the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of being
separated from their ancient connexions, and united by force to strangers.
When the conquest is complete, and the conquered inhabitants can be blended
with the conquerors, or safely governed as a distinct people, public opinion,
which not even the conqueror can disregard, imposes these restraints upon
him; and he cannot neglect them without injury to his fame, and hazard to
his power. But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country was to leave
the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people was impossible,
because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and
were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence. ...
Frequent and bloody wars, in which the whites were not always the aggressors, unavoidably ensued. European policy, numbers, and skill, prevailed. As
the white population advanced, that of the Indian necessarily receded. The
country in the immediate neighborhood of agriculturists became unfit for
them. The game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians
followed. The soil, to which the crown originally claimed title, being no
longer occupied by its ancient inhabitants, was parceled out accordingly to
the will of the sovereign power, and taken possession of by persons who
claimed immediately from the crown, or mediately, through its grantees or
deputies. The law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the
relations between the conqueror and conquered, was incapable of application
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Thus in 1582 did Jurisconsult Balthazar Ayala, Judge Advocate
General of the Royal Army in the Low Countries, pose this fundamental problem of all government and the immediate problem of
military government. He attributed the first observation to book
37 of Livy3 and the second to book 25 of Justin.4 This imperative
enigma, never quite solved by the Romans, and now infinitely more
complicated, is today the foremost concern of all mankind. Whether
it may be at last resolved by the rule of law, or otherwise, remains
to be seen. The progression of the lot of the conquered from certain death, to slavery, to toleration, to humane treatment, to legal
rights has been painfully slow and uncertain, but progress there
has been, attributable largely to the emergence of a law of belligerent
occupation.
A current appraisal of the American law of military government
conceivably might prove to be of more than academic interest in
these turbulent times. Events in Berlin, Algeria, Cuba, Cashmir,
Angola, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Laos, Goa, Argentina
and elsewhere bespeak the continued use of military force to achieve
political objectives, the present de facto existence of military government of one kind or another in many areas and the necessity that
these and all other military governments be restrained by law. At
best, the restoration of law may possibly be achieved in some circumstances by establishing transitional international military government under control of the United Nations or regional international
organizations. 5 The examples of World War IIquadripartite military government and the limited United Nations operations in Korea,
the Gaza strip and the Congo afford precedents which might be
followed. At worst, provocative situations around the world may
eventuate in traditional unilateral national imposition of military
government, in which event the need for clear and binding law will
be even more imperative.
to a people under such circumstances. The resort to some new and different
rule, better adapted to the actual state of things, was unavoidable.. . ." Id.
at 589-91.
Thus the Chief justice concluded, "[Tihe Court is decidedly of opinion,
that the plaintiffs do not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the Courts
of the
United States.... ." Id. at 604.
8
Livy, AB UPBE CONDITA LIBRI bk. 37, at 286 (Sage transl. 1935).
'JUSTIN, HISTORIAE PHILIPPIcAE bk. 25, at 198 (Watson transl. 1886).
'See Taubenfeld, International Armed Forces and the Rides of War, 45
Am. J. INT'L L. 671 (1951).

[Vol. 40

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

The efficacy of international law in this area, as elsewhere, is
somewhat dependent upon the extent to which it has been recognized
in and made a part of the domestic law of individual nations. The
position of the United States in its recognition of the legal foundations of military government is pertinent.
SCOPE OF ARTICLE

In the exploding American periodic literature of general military
law6 the portion thereof devoted to the law of military government
is relatively modest.7 Nevertheless, the total of legal writings on
military government law, foreign and domestic, textual and periodic,
encompasses hundreds of items.' Much of this deals with details of
specific military government operations. The limited purpose of
this article is to assemble those principles of military government
law which have been enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
In most areas of public law the approach to its substance through
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court would be considered impeccable. Here it is open to question since the law of
military government derives primarily from international law and
not from national law. To most American lawyers and laymen a
Supreme Court decision seems to impart to "law" an infallible certi'INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS (Jan. 1909-Jan. 1962).
In the thirtytwo years from 1909 to 1940 about 250 articles were written which in some
way pertained to military law. This was an average of eight a year. In the

twenty-one years from 1940 through 1961 the total output of legal articles
and notes pertaining to military subjects reached the astounding figure of
more than 3200 for an average of more than 150 a year. The indexing has
been changed from time to time, but the principal headings are, Army and
Navy, Courts-Martial, Military Law, National Defense, Soldiers and Sailors,
Veterans, and War, the latter with numerous subdivisions.
'There are slightly more than one hundred articles on the law of military government, practically all of which may be found under the heading
War VIII, Military Occupation of Territory and Governments in Exile in
INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS (1940-55).
8
VON GLAHIN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY

(1957).

This

work contains an excellent bibliography of writings on belligerent occupation
and war crimes which lists some 184 treatises and 358 items of periodic literature plus monographs and official documents.
Representative of this material, which beckons those with a desire to
concentrate on particular American experiences in military government, are:
ALLEN, THE RHINELAND OCCUPATION (1927); BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GovERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW (3d ed. 1914); LITCHFIELD, GOVERNING POSTWAR GERMANY (1953); MAGOON, REPORT ON THE LAW OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN TERRITORY SUBJECT TO MILITARY OCCUPATION BY MILITARY
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tude and eternal rightness which they are unwilling to ascribe to

international law and international tribunals, and which the dissenting Supreme Court Justices themselves refuse to accord to the
views of their own brethren in a given case. In any event, the use
of Supreme Court cases should serve to emphasize that international
law is an integral part of the law of the United States, and that the
fundamentals of military government law have been extensively
recognized and declared by the United States Supreme Court.
DEFINITION

There are under the Constitution three kinds of military
jurisdiction: one to be exercised both in peace and war; another to be exercised in time of foreign war without the
boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and
civil war within states or districts occupied by rebels treated
as belligerents; and a third to be exercised in time of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States,
or during rebellion within the limits of states maintaining
adhesion to the National Government, when the public danger
requires its exercise. The first of these may be called jurisdiction under MILITARY LAW, and is found in acts of
Congress prescribing rules and articles of war, or otherwise
providing for the government of the national forces; the
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1903) (primarily Spanish-American
war experiences); MEADE, AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
(1951); ZINK, AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY (1947).

See also Borton, Occupation Policies in Japan and Korea, 255 Annals 146
(1948); Braibanti, The Ryukyu Islands: Pawn of the Pacific, 48 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 972 (1954); Carpenter, Military Government of Southern Territory, 1861-1865, in THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
ASSOCIATION 465 (1900); Fairman, Some Observations on Military Occupation, 32 MINN. L. REV. 319 (1948); Fisher, Allied Military Government
in Italy, 267 Annals 114 (1950); Ford, Occupation Experiences on Okinawa,
267 Annals 175 (1950); Lauterbach, Hodge's Korea, 23 VA. Q. REv. 349
(1947); McCloy, Anerican Occupation Policies in Germany, 21 AcAD. POL.
SCI. PROc. 540 (1946); McCune, The Occupation of Korea, 23 FoR. POLICY
REP. 186 (1947); Rosinger, The Occupation of Japan, 23 FoR. POLICY REP.
50 (1947); Taylor, The Administration of Occupied Japan, 267 Annals 140
(1950); Thackrey, Military Government in the Pacific: Initial Phase, 60
PoL. ScI. Q. 90 (1945); Thompson, Guam: A Study in Military Government,
13 FAR EASTERN SURVEY 149 (1944); Useem, American Pattern of Military
Government in Micronesia,51 AM. J. Soc. 93 (1945) ; Weiss, U.S. Military
Government on Okinawa, 15 FAR EASTERN SuRVEY 234 (1946); Zimmerman, The Occupation of Iceland by American Forces, 62 POL. Sci. Q. 103
(1947).
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second may be distinguished as MILITARY GOVERNMENT, superseding, as far as may be deemed expedient,
the local law, and exercised by the military commander under
the direction of the President, with the express or implied
sanction of Congress; while the third may be denominated
MARTIAL LAW PROPER, and is called into action by
Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril,
by the President, in times of insurrection or invasion, or
of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where
ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and
private rights.
This classic definition given by Chief Justice Chase in 1866 in
his separate opinion in Ex parte MilliganY is valid today.
NOT

COURTS-MARTIAL JURISDICTION

We are not here concerned with what Chief Justice Chase called
military law, now usually referred to as military justice, which deals
with the trial by courts-martial of persons subject to the criminal
jurisdiction conferred by the Uniform Code of Military Justice,"
and which has developed a vast literature of its own. 2
It is important to observe that the Supreme Court decisions which
struck down the jurisdiction of courts-martial conferred by Congress
over civilians accompanying or serving with the armed forces of the
1071

164

U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141-42 (1866).

Stat. 108 (1950), 10 U.S.C. §§801-940 (1958), as amended, 10

U.S.C.A. §§ 802, 858a, 958a, 923a, 936 (Supp. 1961). The Uniform Code
of Military justice is the most recent exercise by Congress of its consti-

tutional power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval forces." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. It has exercised this power
from the foundation of the government commencing with its enactment of

September 29, 1789, which, with some amendments, adopted the provisions
of the Articles of War enacted by the Second Continental Congress in 1776.
See WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 23 (2d ed. 1920).
12 In the thirty years before the Uniform Code became effective (May 31,
1951), the decisions of the Boards of Review, the intermediate appellate
tribunals of the military justice system, aggregated more than 141 large
volumes. In less than eleven years under the Uniform Code, Board of
Review opinions combined with decisions of the United States Court of
Military Appeals have been published in thirty volumes designated as CourtsMartial Reports totalling some 27,000 pages. The eleven volumes of the
reports of the United States Court of Military Appeals alone exceed 8200
pages. In the same period the articles listed under Courts-Martial in the
INDEX To LEGAL PERIODIcALS are close to five hundred in number. Gaynor,
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United States in foreign countries in time of peace' did not purport

to divest,' 4 and have been judicially evaluated as not divesting, the
jurisdiction of military commissions to try civilians, even though
they are American citizens, where such commissions sit as military
government courts in occupied areas.' 5
The problems of the exercise of courts-martial jurisdiction over
Military Law Source Material, 55 LAw LIB. JR. 16 (1962), gives a good

general bibliography. For a textual treatment of military justice, see
A cocK & WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUsTIcE (1955).
"8McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960)
(non-capital offenses committed by civilian employees); Grisham v. Hagen,
361 U.S. 278 (1960) (capital offense committed by civilian employee);
Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (non-capital offense committed
by dependant); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), reversing on rehearing
Kinsella v. Kruger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487
(1956) (capital offenses committed by wives of military personnel).
As pointed out by the dissenting Justices in the second Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 78 (1957) : "[I]n substitute therefor [for the previous decisions]
it enters no opinion whatever for the Court. It is unable to muster a majority opinion. Instead, there are handed down three opinions." In this
same case Justice Black, joined by three Justices in voting to overrule the
prior Reid decision, stated: "There have been a number of decisions in the
lower federal courts which have upheld military trial of civilians performing
services for the armed forces 'in the field' during time of war.... In the
face of an actively hostile enemy, military commanders necessarily have
broad power over persons on the battlefront. From a time prior to the
adoption of the Constitution the extraordinary circumstances present in an
area of actual fighting have been considered sufficient to permit punishment
of some civilians in that area by military courts under military rules." Id.
at 33. (Emphasis is the Justice's.) Justice Frankfurter, who joined with
the majority, concluded: "What has been urged falls . . . short of proving a
well-established practice . . . of court-martial jurisdiction, certainly not in

capital cases, over such civilians in time of peace." Id. at 64.
" Madsen v. Overholser, 251 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
920, petition for rehearing denied, 356 U.S. 920 (1958). The petitioner,
Madsen, killed her Air Force lieutenant husband in Frankfurt, Germany, in
1949, was convicted by a United States military government court in Germany for this offense, and on habeas corpus attack, the jurisdiction of that
tribunal was upheld in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). Petitioner's
contention in the later habeas corpus proceeding against Overholser was
that the last ruling of the Court in Reid v. Covert, supra note 14, divested
the military government court of jurisdiction over her. The court of appeals
denied this contention, stating that it was bound by the Madsen decision.
This ruling the Supreme Court refused to review. It is elementary that a
denial of certiorari does not bind the Supreme Court to the rule announced
in a lower court. It is probable that some, but less than a majority, of the
present members of the Supreme Court will take every opportunity to strike
down military jurisdiction. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 181 (1962). It is foolhardy, for even a devoted follower of
the Supreme Court, to predict what it may do next. With all these qualifications it does seem accurate to say that, as of the present, Covert has not
detracted from the authority of Madsen. The Madsen decision will be hereafter considered in more detail.
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forces stationed in friendly foreign countries is also to be excluded
from our inquiry. 6 The NATO Status of Forces Agreement 17 now
elaborately divides up this jurisdiction between the host and guest
states and provides for joint political determination as to which
state shall exercise jurisdiction in a particular case where either
state so requests.' 8 The Supreme Court has held that this arrangement, since it comes within the sphere of international relations, is
not subject to its judicial review.' 9 Such jurisdiction when exercised in friendly allied countries is a special application of military
justice, or what Chief Justice Chase defined as military law.2" It
is not a function of military government.
A distinction should be made here between types of military
courts, which is as valid today as when made by the Supreme Court
in 1864.
[M]ilitary jurisdiction is of two kinds. First, that which is
conferred and defined by statute; second, that which is derived
from the common law of war. "Military offences, under the
statutes, must be tried in the manner therein directed; but
military offences, which do not come within the statute, must
be tried and punished under the common law of war." . . .
In the armies of the United States, the first is exercised
by courts-martial, while cases which do not come within
the . . . jurisdiction conferred by statute on court-martial,
are tried by military commissions. 1

" The original international law rule on this question was enunciated by
Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116 (1812), to the effect that exclusive jurisdiction over visiting
forces remains vested in the guest sovereign whom they serve. This rule,
either with or without national legislation, was generally followed until after
the Second World War. Since then it has been replaced by detailed treaty
provisions
and implementing agreements.
7" North Atlantic Treaty, June
19, 1951, [1953] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1792,
T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
"Id. art. VII, para. 3(c), at 1798-1802.
" Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). See also United States ex rel.
Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952
(1955).
"The special problems of exercising jurisdiction over visiting forces are
considered in SNEE & PYE, STATUS OF FORcEs AGREEMENTS AND CRIMINAL
JURIsDIcTION (1957).
21

Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 249 (1864). (Emphasis is the Court's.) This statement the Court adopted almost verbatim from
section 679 of General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General Office, 1863, pre-
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It is safe to say, as a practical matter, that where a court-martial
exercises jurisdiction the cause is not one within the scope of military
government. While article 18 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice expressly gives concurrent jurisdiction to courts-martial in
all cases cognizable by military commissions,22 it is not the practice

to convene courts-martial in situations where it has been customary
to use military commissions.23 This may in part be the case because
of the simpler procedures applicable to military commissions. Furthermore courts-martial have no civil jurisdiction, except as this
might conceivably be held to be granted by the concurrent jurisdiction provision just mentioned. It seems clear that only criminal
and not civil jurisdiction was intended. There are no courts-martial
procedures by which civil, as distinguished from criminal, litigation
may be conducted. Frequently military commissions sitting as military government courts are confronted with the necessity of trying
civil cases.
Congress, in article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
has been careful to preserve the established jurisdiction of military
commissions, but did not extend to them courts-martial jurisdiction. 4
NOT MARTIAL LAW

Also to be distinguished from military government is what Chief
justice Chase denominated martial law proper. This is instituted
by Congress, or temporarily in great emergency by the President,
placing domestic territory under military control in time of invasion
or insurrection of such magnitude that normal civil government is
unable to function. 5 Quite properly, the Supreme Court has engaged
pared by Francis Lieber and published by President Lincoln for the guidance
of the
Union forces.
22 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1958), in pertinent part provides: "General courtsmartial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is
subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war."
2'

It

has occasionally been done.

E.g., United States v. Schultz, 1

U.S.C.M.A. 512, 4 C.M.R. 104 (1952) (negligent homicide by an American

civilian in occupied Japan).
1'10 U.S.C. § 821 (1958), reads: "The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions,

provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with
respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be
tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals."
See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 350 (1952).
"A definitive text is FAIRMAN, THn LAW OF MARTIAL RUtE (2d ed.
1943). See especially id. at 41-43, where the author is careful to distinguish
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in strict judicial review of the exercise of martial law and in at least
three instances has declared such exercise invalid.2"
NOT WAR CRIMES

There remains for exclusion the large and important field of
war crimes, which is concerned with the prosecution of all persons,
both military and civilian, who commit violations of the laws of war.
Such offenses may arise out of combat operations and have no connection at all with military government 2 or may be law of war
violations by an enemy military governor or his subordinates in an
occupied area and so have a direct relation to military government.28
In either case the American practice has been to establish separate
agencies for the prosecution and trial of war crimes. This function
has not normally been performed by military government personnel
nor have war crimes cases been tried by military government courts. 20
The prosecution of the major war criminals of the Second World
War were conducted before specially convened international military
tribunals at Nuremberg, Germany and Tokyo, Japan. Both civilians
and military personnel were used by the United States as its members
of, and prosecutors and defense counsel for, these courts. 80
between martial law and military government. See also Fairman, The Law
of MartialRide and the National Emergency, 55 HARv. L. R.v. 1253 (1942),
and The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction:Martial Ride in Hawaii
and the Yamashita Case, 59 HAzv. L. Rzv. 833 (1946); Holdsworth, Martial
Law Historically Considered, 18 L.Q. Ruv. 117 (1902).
28 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (martial law improper

where civil courts closed only because area military commander so ordered) ;
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) (martial law declared by governor improper where purpose is to prevent enforcement of federal court
order); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (martial law improper where civil courts are open). See also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
1 (1849).
How.)
27
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The Court here upheld the jurisdiction of a military commission to try unlawful belligerents of enemy forces
for law of war violations committed in the continental United States.
" in re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The Court here upheld the jurisdiction of a military commission to try a Japanese military governor of the
occupied Philippines for law of war violations committed by his subordinates.
Accord, Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946) (per curiam).
"However, flexibility in this regard is possible. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY,
FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 505d, at 180 (1956) [hereinafter cited as FM 27-10], which is authoritative so far as the United States
army practice is concerned, provides: "War crimes are within the jurisdiction of general courts-martials (UCMJ, Art. 18), military commissions,
provost courts, military governments courts, and other military tribunals
Art. 21) of the United States, as well as of international tribunals."
(UCMJ,
0
" JAcKsoN, THE NUREMBERG CASE (1947); INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
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Other war crimes tribunals were convened by the United States
at Nuremberg under the international authority of Allied Control
Council Law No. 10.31 Although these latter courts in each case
consisted exclusively of three American judges drawn from civilian
32
life they were held to be international, and not national courts.
The Supreme Court has held it has no jurisdiction whatever to
inquire into the proceedings of international tribunals in which the
United States is a participant. 3
Still other war crimes trials were conducted in Germany, the
Philippines, Japan and elsewhere by American military commissions composed of United States Army Officers. Trial and defense
counsel for these tribunals were drawn from both officer and civilian
3 4

attorneys.

As to non-resident enemy aliens who are captured, held in military custody, tried and convicted by an American military commission and imprisoned, all these events occurring outside the United
States for offenses against the law of war committed outside the
TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-

(1947-49); Agreement for the Prosecutionand
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, in 39 AM.
J. INT'L L. 257 (Supp. 1945); International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg)-udgment and Sentences, in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947); The
Legal
Basis for Trial of War Criminals, 19 TEMP. L.Q. 133 (1946).
1
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

" TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10 (1949);

TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1949).

" Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 879
(1949), rehearing denied, 33, U.S. 940 (1950). The case reviews the

authority under which the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 Tribunals were
convened.
" Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949) (per curiam). The Court
here stated: "We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these petitioners
is not a tribunal of the United States. The United States and other allied

countries conquered and now occupy and control Japan.

General Douglas

MacArthur has been selected and is acting as the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers.

The military tribunal sentencing these petitioners has

been set up by General MacArthur as the agent of the Allied Powers. Under
the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no power
or authority to review, to affirm, to set aside or annul the judgments and
sentences imposed on these petitioners and for this reason the motions for

leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied." Id. at 198.
Accord, Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
879 (1949), rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 940 (1950), where the ruling in

Hirota was applied to cases tried in Germany by war crimes tribunals convened by the United States under the authority of Allied Control Council

Law No. 10.
"Cowles, Trials of War Criminals (Non-Nuremberg), 42 AM. J. INT'L

L. 299 (1948).
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United States, the Supreme Court has held it has no jurisdiction
whatever.3 5 Only where some of these significant events have occurred within United States territory will the Supreme Court review
3
American war crimes tribunal proceedings, " and then only for the
limited purpose of determining whether the American military commission had jurisdiction.3
The prosecution of war crimes offenses committed by American
personnel either military or civilian is not normally the responsibility
of military government. Usually United States military personnel
are tried by courts-martial for such offenses. American civilians,
for law of war offenses, at least those committed within the United
States, are tried by the civil courts. 38 American civilians who commit war crimes in American occupied foreign territory may be tried
there by military government courts or by specially convened military commissions.
" Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 n.1 (1950), where the Court
cites more than two hundred cases involving motions for leave to file habeas
corpus petitions made by German enemy aliens confined by American military
authorities abroad pursuant to war crimes sentences pronounced by American
military commissions. The status of all but nonresident enemy aliens in this
regard is probably still open to debate.
" In Johnson v. Eisentrager, supra note 35, at 779, the Court pointed out
that these conditions existed in both Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942),
and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945).
" "The jurisdiction of military authorities, during or following hostilities,
to punish those guilty of offenses against the laws of war is long-established.
By the Treaty of Versailles, 'The German government recognizes the right
of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons
accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.'
Article 228. This Court has characterized as 'well-established' the 'power
of the military to exercise jurisdiction over members of the armed forces,
those directly connected with such forces, or enemy belligerents, prisoners of
war, or others charged with violating the laws of war.' Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313-314. And we have held in the Quirin [317 U.S. 1
(1942)] and Yamashita cases [327 U.S. 1 (1945)] . . . that the Military

Commission is a lawful tribunal to adjudge enemy offenses against the laws
of war. It is not for us to say whether these prisoners were or were not
guilty of a war crime, or whether if we were to retry the case we would

agree to the findings of fact or the application of the laws of war made by
the Military Commission. The petition shows that these prisoners were
formally accused of violating the laws of war and fully informed of particulars of these charges. As we observed in the Yamashita case, 'If the military
tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action is
not subject to judicial review merely because they have made a wrong decision on disputed facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for
the courts but for the military authorities which are alone authorized to
review their decisions.' . . . 'We consider here only the lawful power of
the commission to try the petitioner for the offense charged.' .. ." Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786-87 (1950).
8 FM 27-10, para. 507b, at 182, provides: "The United States normally
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From the foregoing discussion it becomes apparent that while
military commissions are a typical form of military government
court, other well established and distinct uses are also made of military commissions. Conversely, we shall see that great flexibility
in the composition of military government courts is permissible.
NOT CIVIL AFFAIRS

One more distinction remains to be made. Civil affairs administration is on occasion established in friendly territory by express or
implied agreement with the regular government of that area which,
for the time being, is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility. This situation may arise in friendly territory liberated from
enemy occupation. Examples are the civil affairs activities of the
United States Army in France in 1944, and in the Philippines, in
conjunction with the Osmena government, in 1944 and 1945. These
were not occupations. Civil affairs agreements were concluded with
the lawful government; military government operations by American
forces were kept to the minimum and were terminated as soon as
the domestic governments were able to function fully. 9 The continued presence of United States forces in West Germany is no
longer an occupation. It is now controlled by extensive intergovernpunishes war crimes as such only if they are committed by enemy nationals
or by persons serving the interests of the enemy State. Violations of the
law of war committed by persons subject to the military law of the United
States will usually constitute violations of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and, if so, will be prosecuted under that Code. Violations of the law
of war committed within the United States by other persons will usually constitute violations of federal or state criminal law and preferably will be
prosecuted under such law. Commanding officers of United States troops
must insure that war crimes committed by members of their forces against
enemy personnel are promptly and adequately punished." Supreme Court
precedent for this method of disposing of offenses committed by our own
military personnel was established in Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509
(1878), and in Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158 (1879).
"oWhile the degree and emphasis may vary widely, the same general
activities which in friendly countries are designated as civil affairs are known
in occupied enemy territory as military government. The authoritative manual applicable alike to the United States Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine
Corps operations, by its very title indicates this. U.S. DEP'TS OF THE ARMY,
NAVY & AIR FORCE, FM 41-5, OPNAV P 21-1, AFM 110-7, NAVMC 2500,
[hereJOINT MANUAL OF CIVIL AFFAIRS/MIlLITARY GOVERNMENT (1958)
inafter cited as JOINT MANUAL]. The manual provides: "The same military
organization employed to conduct military government is used to conduct
civil affairs." Id. para. 4b, at 8. It also points out that the standard abbreviation "CAMG" refers to either or both civil affairs and military government. Id. para. 2a, at 2.
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mental agreements4 ° which almost completely equate the situation
there to the Status of Forces arrangements pertaining in other North
Atlantic Treaty Organization areas. 41 These NATO mutual arrangements are certainly not occupations, nor are they civil affairs
administrations.
THE LEGAL SOURCE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT POWERS

Military government for some period, in some area, in some
form, seems to occur with the same regularity as war itself. It has
been called into use in every war in the national history of the United
States. Military government problems have been regularly in litigation before the United States Supreme Court since 1819.42 What
then is the legal basis for military government?
Military government is the form of administration by which an
occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied enemy territory or domestic territory recovered
from rebels treated as belligerents, or allied or neutral territory
liberated from the enemy and which is not yet the subject of a civil
affairs agreement. Both customary and conventional international
law impose a duty upon an occupant to take all measures in his power
to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.
This customary law of war was first applied by the Supreme
Court to a situation arising in the War of 1812. Mr. Justice Story,
speaking for the Court, said:
The single question arising on the pleadings in this case
is, whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the
revenue laws upon goods imported into the United States.
It appears, by the pleadings, that on the first day of September, 1814, Castine was captured by the enemy, and remained
in his exclusive possession, under the command and control
of his military and naval forces, until after the ratification of
the treaty of peace in February, 1815. During this period
the British government exercised all civil aud military author' 0 THE STATus OF NATO FORCES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIc OF GERMANY (1959) (supplementary agreement of August 3, 1959).
" North Atlantic Treaty, June 19, 1951, art. VII, [1953] 2 U.S.T. &

2846.(4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
1792, States
1798, T.I.A.S.
O.I.A.
17 U.S.
v. Rice, No.
,2 United
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ity over the place; and established a custom-house, and admitted goods to be imported, according to regulations prescribed by itself, and, among others, admitted the goods upon
which duties are now demanded ...
[T] he claim for duties cannot be sustained ......

Similar Supreme Court recognition of the basic principle was
accorded while upholding the validity of customs duties imposed by
American military government in California during the Mexican
War. The Court said:
California, or the port of San Francisco, had been conquered by the arms of the United States as early as 1846.
Shortly afterward the United States had military possession
of all of Upper California. Early in 1847 the President, as
Constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,
authorized the military and naval commander of our forces in
California to exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror,
and to form a civil government for the conquered country,
and to impose duties on imports and tonnage as military contributions for the support of the government, and of the army
which had the conquest in possession.... No one can doubt
that these orders of the President, and the action of our army
and navy commander in California, in conformity with them,
was according to the law of arms and the right of conquest,
or that they were operative until the ratification and exchange
of a treaty of peace. Such would be the case upon general
principles in respect to war and peace between nations. .... 44
During the Civil War, New Orleans was held in occupation by
Union forces from May 1, 1862 until March 18, 1866. During the
military occupation, the city was governed by a mayor, a board
of finance and a board of street landings, appointed by the commanding general. In July 1865 these officials leased a landing to a
steamship company for a ten year term. In upholding this lease, the
Supreme Court through Justice Swayne declared:
Although the city of New Orleans was conquered and
taken possession of in a civil war waged on the part of the
United States to put down an insurrection and restore the
,Id. at 253.

"Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 190 (1853).
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supremacy of the National government in the Confederate
States, that government had the same power and rights in
territory held by conquest as if the territory had belonged to
a foreign country and had been subjugated in a foreign war.
In such cases the conquering power has a right to displace
the pre-existing authority, and to assume to such extent as it
may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and
functions of government. It may appoint all the necessary
officers and clothe them with designated powers, larger or
smaller, according to its pleasure. It may prescribe the revenues to be paid, and apply them to its own use or otherwise.
It may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken
the enemy. There is no limit to the powers that may be
exerted in such cases, save those which are found in the laws
and usages of war. These principles have the sanction of all
publicists who have considered the subject.4 5
By the time Spanish American War litigation reached the Supreme Court it was no longer confined to citing in support of the
legal basis of military government its own previous decisions which
recognized the customary rule of international law. It then could
cite, and did, conventional international law to which the United
States was a party. The Court said in MacLeod v. United States: 4
What should constitute military occupation was one of the
matters before the Hague Convention in 1899 respecting laws
and customs of war on land, and the following articles were
adopted by the nations giving adherence to that Convention,
among which is the United States. (32 Stat. 11 (1821)) :...
"New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 393 (1874).
The legal foundation of military government power in Louisiana during the
Civil War is discussed in some detail in United States v. Reiter, 27 Fed. Cas.
768 (No. 16146) (1865). The rationale by which the Supreme Court consistently viewed Federal military operations in Confederate States territory
as occurring in enemy, and not domestic territory, and hence as being in the
exercise of military government, is set forth at length in Dow v. Johnson,
100 U.S. 158, 164 (1879).
'229 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1913). The identical language of article 43
of the Hague Convention of 1899 is carried forward into article 43 of the
Annex to Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2295, T.S. No. 539
[hereinafter cited as The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539],
and in this latter form is officially prescribed in pertinent field manuals as
binding on American forces. FM 27-10 para. 363, at 141; JoINT MANUAL
para. 7d, at 17.
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Article XLIII. The authority of the legitimate power
having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the
latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in
the country.
When military government powers exercised in West Germany
following the Second World War were challenged, the Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Burton, tersely observed: "The
President has the urgent and infinite responsibility not only of combating the enemy but of governing any territory occupied by the
United States by force of arms."4 7
WHEN AND WHERE MILITARY GOVERNMENT PREVAILS

"'Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation applies only
to the territory where such authority is established, and in a position
to assert itself.' ,,48
This test boils down to the practical recognition of effective military possession at the time and place in question. An entire country,
nor even a whole political subdivision thereof, need not be occupied
before military government may be exercised. The Supreme Court
approved acts of military government by the British in 1814 at the
port of Castine, Maine, when the rest of Maine and of the United
States was under United States control ;4 by a federal commissioner
in Memphis, Tennessee in 1864, when active military lines were
within a mile of the city;5" and by a short-lived native insurgent
7
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348 (1951), citing article 43 of The
Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539.
" MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 426 (1913), quoting and
applying Article 42 of the Hague Convention of 1899. Its successor, Article
42 of The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539, changes the last
sentence to read: "The occupation extends only to the territory where such
authority has been established and can be exercised." FM 27-10 para. 351,
at 138.
"'United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819) (customs collection).
'o
Keely v. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441 (1878). In upholding a tax sale conducted by the United States commissioner on June 24, 1864, the Court stated:
"The city of Memphis, it is conceded, was in full and undisputed possession
of the Federal army. All that is proved is that the military lines were around

the city, at a distance of a mile or so from its corporate limits, and that the
remaining part of the county was not in Federal occupation. All that is
quite consistent with the fact that Federal military authority was established
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government which styled itself the Philippine Republic in 1899 at
Cebu City, Philippines, when most of the ports of the Philippines
were already under United States military control. "l Nor are acts
of military government invalidated simply by reason of the fact that
such government survives only briefly. The British military government at Castine existed from September 1814 until February 1815,
and that of the insurgent Philippine Republic at Cebu from December 25, 1898 to February 22, 1899. Effective control is essential
52
to the status of occupation.
WHO EXERCISES MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Normally the military commander of the occupying force becomes the military governor and is the immediate responsible head
of the military government. 3 Usually an executive directive regarding military government is provided for the military commander, 4 but not necessarily so. Flexibility of organization is a
basic principle.5" Thus in the occupation of Japan, General MacArthur was not only the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces of the
Far East but Military Governor as well. In Europe General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe, elected
to appoint General Clay American Military Governor initially. Later
over the whole county. No conquering army occupies the entire territory
conquered. Its authority is established when it occupies and holds securely
the most important places, and when there is no opposing governmental
authority within the territory. The inability of any other power to establish

and maintain governmental authority therein is the test." Id. at 447.
'MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416 (1913).

FM 27-10 para. 356, at 139.
In Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177 (1857), the
Supreme Court, in speaking of military government in New Mexico, said:
"General Kearney, holding possession for the United States, in virtue of the
power of conquest and occupancy, . . . ordained, under the sanction and
authority of the United States, a provisional or temporary Government for
the acquired country." The Court referred to the first American statutory
laws of New Mexico as "Kearney's Code." And in United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 526 (1875), the Court had this to say: "New Orleans was
• . .the theater of .. . military operations. . .
General Butler, in command, was the military ruler. His will was law, and necessarily so."
" President Lincoln's executive order of October 20, 1862, establishing
military government courts in Louisiana, is set out in Burke v. Miltenberger,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 519-20 (1873). The order of President McKinley to
the Secretary of War on July 18, 1898, on the occupation of Cuba, is re-

printed in 7

MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1143, at 261 (1906).
" JOINT MANUAL para. 3f, at 6, provides: "The military governor is the

military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory,
exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and
usages of war and to any directive received from his government or from his
superior."
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Mr. McCloy, a State Department civilian, succeeded General Clay
in this post, by presidential designation, under the title of United
5 6
States High Commissioner for Germany.
The military commander exercises this power, "under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of
57
Congress."
FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The functions of a military government may be as varied as
those performed by any civil government.5" This has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court in unequivocal terms.
A terse judicial statement to this effect is found in New Orleans v.
Steamship Co.:"'
[T]he conquering power has a right to displace the preexisting authority, and to assume, to such extent as it may
deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of government. It may appoint all the necessary officers
and clothe them with designated powers, larger or smaller,
according to its pleasure. It may prescribe the revenues to
be paid, and apply them to its own use or otherwise. It may
do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the
enemy. There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted
in such cases, save those which are found in the laws and
usages of war.
And in United States v. Rice ° Justice St~ry (later Chief Justice)
"' Exec. Order No. 10062, 14 Fed. Reg. 2965 (1949), cited in Madsen v.
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 356-57 (1951).
.7 ExRparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 142 (1866) (Opinion of Chase,
C'I JOINT MANUAL para. 23, at 41, states the functions of military government: "(1) Governmental Functions-(a) Legal, (b) Public Safety, (c)
Public Health, (d) Public Welfare, (e) Public Finance, (f) Public Education, (g) Labor. (2) Economic Functions-(a) Economics, (b) Commerce
and Industry, (c) Food and Agriculture, (d) Price Control and Rationing,
(e)Property Control, (f) Civilian Supply. (3) Public Facilities Functionsa) Public Works and Utilities, (b) Public Communications, (c) Public
Transportation. (4) Special Functions-(a) Civil Information, (b) Displaced Persons, (c) Arts, Monuments, and Archives."
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 394 (1874). See also United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 526 (1875): "Martial law is the law of military necessity
in the actual presence of war. It is administered by the general of the army,
and is in fact his will. Of necessity it is arbitrary; but it must be obeyed";
Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1, 9 (1868); Leitensdorfer v. Webb,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177 (1857); 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 54, § 20.
0 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 254 (1819).
It should be noted that current
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said: "By the conquest and military occupation of Castine, the enemy
acquired that firm possession which enabled him to exercise the
fullest rights of sovereignty over that place."
While the Supreme Court has consistently declared 6' the practically unlimited legal powers of a military government, United States
military authorities have uniformly imposed self-restraints upon the
exercise of this power. General Order No. 287, promulgated by
General Winfield Scott in Mexico City on September 17, 1847,2
presumably without benefit of legal precedent, not only evidenced
doctrine does not extend to a claim that "sovereignty" vests in a military
government though Justice Story used broad language to that effect here.
An interesting case is Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952), which reaches the conclusion that the
United States military occupation of the Ryukyu Islands in 1948 did not
vest "de jure sovereignty" thereof in the United States but only "de facto
sovereignty," that since Okinawa was "a foreign country" the Federal Tort
Claims Act was inapplicable there, and that a person injured in an accident
involving a government crane could not maintain a suit against the United
States. Cobb is followed in Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720 (4th Cir.
1957), which decided that even after the treaty of peace with Japan, tort
claims arising in the Ryukyus were not actionable against the United States.
Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1958), reaches the same result
regarding torts occurring on XKwajalein, which, under the United Nations,
the 61
United States now administers as trust territory.
Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 195
(1815). Here Chief Justice Marshall in delivering the opinion of the Court
upholding a capture and condemnation of enemy property which occurred
during the War of 1812 said: "Although acquisitions made during war are
not considered as permanent until confirmed by treaty, yet to every commercial and belligerent purpose, they are considered as a part of the domain of
the conqueror, so long as he retains the possession and government of them.
The island of Santa Cruz, after its capitulation, remained a British island
until it was restored to Denmark. Must the produce of a plantation in that
island, shipped by the proprietor himself, who is a Dane residing in Denmark, be considered as British, and therefore enemy property?" The Chief
Justice concluded: "In condemning the sugars of Mr. Bentzon as enemy
property, this Court is of opinion that there was no error." Id. at 199.
In the last case before the Supreme Court in which this problem was considered, Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), the Court stated: "[T]he
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in 1945 established,
through the Commanding General of the United States Forces in the European Theater, a United States Military Government for Germany within the
United States Area of Control." Id. at 356. The official steps by which this
was done are set forth in an appendix to its opinion. Id. at 362.
62 This classical document of American military government is reprinted
in BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 541 (3d ed.
1914). In part it provided: "14. For the ease and safety of both parties in
all cities and towns occupied by the American Army, a Mexican police shall
be established, and duly harmonized with the military police of said forces.
15. This splendid capital, its churches and religious worship, its convents and
monasteries, its inhabitants and property are, moreover, placed under the
special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army." General
Order 287 is discussed further infra.
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this restraint but was substantially in accord with current military
government practice.
In 1863, section 15 of General Order 199 of the United States
forces stated "men who take up arms against one another in public
war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to
one another and to God."6
This was preceded on April 24, 1863
by General Order 100, usually referred to as the Lieber Code. That
famous document, issued to govern the conduct of Union forces in
the Civil War, was the first real codification of the laws of war. At
the direction of President Lincoln the War Department issued orders
that this code be written by Francis Lieber and a board of generals.
Lieber, a German born and trained lawyer, who for many years was
a professor of law at the University of South Carolina, was chairman
of the board and the actual author. His code devoted twelve sections
specifically to military government and in its over-all treatment of
the laws of war contained one hundred and fifty one sections.6 4
General Order 100 was the direct ancestor of the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907. It is not too much to say that this American
product of the Civil War set the pattern for the whole later development of the conventional international law of war embracing not
only military government but also the conduct of fighting, the rights
of civilians, the treatment of prisoners of war, the sick and wounded
and the status of guerilla warfare.6 5
The Lieber Code in its entirety was republished by the United
" GEN. 0. 199, § 15 (1863), quoted in Colby, Occupation Under Laws of
War,
25 CoLUM. L. REv. 904, 918 (1925).
6 GEN. 0. 100 (1863), in BIRKHIMER, op. cit. supra note 64, at 633-34.
Section 671 thereof reads, "Military Government simply is military authority
exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war. Military oppression is not military government; it is an abuse of the power which the law of
war confers. As military government is carried on by military force, it is
incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles
of justice, honor and humanity-virtues adorning a soldier even more than
other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against
the 6unarmed."
GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION

1863-1914, at 13-36 (1949), presents an interesting detailed account of the
vast influence of the Lieber Code upon not only the international law of
war but the national manuals of most nations published for the guidance of
their military forces. Davis, Dr. Francis Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field, 1 Am. J. INT'L L. 13 (1907), gives a biographical account of Dr. Lieber and discusses the importance of his work.
Bivens, Restatement of the Laws of War as Applied to the Armed Forces of
Collective Security Arrangements, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 140 (1954), espouses
the formulation of an up to date code for collective enforcement forces, comparable to Lieber's Code.
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States War Department in 1898 and its provisions were followed in
the Spanish American War. In 1914 it was in part reproduced in
the Rules of Land Warfare manual then issued by the War Department.66
The current United States military government manual, with
increasing refinement, continues to insist upon moderation in the
exercise of military government. It provides :67
War is not an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian
principles. To a large extent these principles have been given
concrete form in the law of war; but because all of these principles have not become legal rules, a military commander
must consider whether a proposed course of action will be
humane even though not expressly prohibited by international
law....

Subject to the requirements of the military situation, the
principle of governing for the benefit of the governed should
be observed.

6

1

The duties of military government personnel should be
confined wherever possible to supervision over existing or
re-established civilian authorities, thereby affecting [sic]
economy of personnel. 9
[T]he occupant may need to assume only a minimum of
military government functions if the local government is
effective and not hostile to the occupant."'
It will normally be the ultimate objective of an occupation
to leave behind government oriented in Western democratic
principles and which will not be a threat to future peace and
world stability. This may best be accomplished through the
establishment of an efficient and popularly accepted government, stable economic and financial conditions, and respect
for law and order. Normally it will be the policy of an occupant to allow the maximum political freedom consistent with
71
military security and public order.
These principles of military government seem to reflect the philosophy that that government is best which governs least. This is
"7 JOINT
GRABR, op. cit. supra note 65, at 19.08
MANUAL para. 6b, at 13.
Id. para. 6c, at 13.
1

1

" Id. at para. 6c, at 14.
Id. para. 7b, at 15.

71

oId. para. 17b, at 32.
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perhaps surprising in view of how little influence that philosophy
seems to have on most civil governments at the present time.
It is only natural that some aspects of military government have
been more frequently subjected to judicial review by the Supreme
Court than others. A few of these merit separate consideration.
LAW ENFORCEMENT

It is not surprising that law enforcement areas of military government have frequently been subjected to Supreme Court scrutiny.
The original concept was that there was practically no limit upon
the discretion of the military commander as to what law should be
enforced in an occupied area. Thus, in the British occupation of
Castine, Maine, the Court declared:
[T]he laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully
enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who
remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender
the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the
British government, and were bound by such laws, and such
only, as it chose to recognize and impose."
That the power of the military governor extended not only to
the suspension and promulgation of laws, but to the establishment of
a whole judicial system as well, was recognized by the Court as
early as the Mexican War. In upholding the action of General
Kearney in New Mexico, the Court said:
[T] here was ordained by the provisional Government a judicial system, which created a superior or appellate court, constituted of three judges; and circuit courts, in which the laws
were to be administered by the judges of the superior or
appellate court, in the circuits to which they should be respectively assigned. . ..
[T]he jurisdiction of the Circuit
Courts . . . was . . . to embrace, 1st, all criminal cases that

shall not be otherwise provided by law; and, 2d, exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil cases which shall not be cognizable before the prefects and alcaldes ....
Of the validity
of these ordinances ... there is made no question ... and it

would seem to admit of no doubt that during the period of
their valid existence and operation, these ordinances must
" United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 254 (1857).
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have displaced and superseded every previous institution of
the vanquished or deposed political power which was incompatible with them."
In this same case the Court noted that there were limits to this
power of the military governor:
"The modem usage of nations, which has become law, would
be violated, and that sense of justice and right which is
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be
outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated
and private rights annulled. The people change their allegiance; their relation to their sovereign is dissolved; but
their relations to each other, and their rights of property re74
main undisturbed."
The fundamental power to establish courts was consistently reaffirmed in reviewing litigation conducted in military government
courts in various areas of the Confederacy in Civil War times. In
the basic case of this era, which upheld the jurisdiction of the Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, the Court noted that the
administration of justice was a duty as well as a right of a belligerent
occupant:
The object of the National government in the Civil War
indeed, was neither conquest nor subjugation, but the overthrow of the insurgent organization ...and the re-establishment of legitimate authority. But in the attainment of these
ends, through military force, it became the duty of the National government, wherever the insurgent power was overthrown, . . . to provide as far as possible, so long as the war
continued, for the security of persons and property, and for
the administration of justice.
The duty of the National government, in this respect, was
no other than that which devolves upon the government of a
regular belligerent occupying, during war, the territory of
another belligerent. It was a military duty, to be performed
by the President as commander-in-chief ....7
Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 178 (1857).

Id. at 177-78, quoting from United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.? 51, 86-87 (1833).
" The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 132 (1869).

In Pennywit v.

Eaton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 382, 384 (1872), the Court said: "The second
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The Civil War produced the first case in which the Supreme
Court rejected a purported judicial act of a military governor. In
1868 a court of common pleas in South Carolina granted a mortgage
foreclosure decree and directed a commissioner's sale. Shortly thereafter General Canby issued an order annulling this decree. The
commissioner, however, conducted the sale and the foreclosure was
ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed, stating that General Canby's
order was a wholly "arbitrary stretch of authority, needful of no
good end that can be imagined." 6 This result is undoubtedly correct in finding there was no jurisdiction to engage in this capricious
intervention.
Civil and criminal jurisdiction of military government courts
was again upheld by the Supreme Court in litigation resulting
from the Spanish American War." The most recent occasion for
the Supreme Court to consider the legal status of a military government court arose from the conviction in 1950 of an Air Force lieutenant's wife for the murder of her husband. The petitioner had
been convicted by a United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany and brought a writ of habeas corpus, contending that she should have been tried by a courts-martial and that
the occupation court was without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
denied the petition, stating that "since our nation's earliest days,
such commissions have been constitutionally recognized" 7' and that
in the absence of congressional limitations the President, as Coinquestion relates to the validity of the appointment of the judge who presided
in the court of the Fourth District of New Orleans. His commission came
from the military governor, who was appointed by the President during the
late war. We have already decided that such appointments were within the
power of such a governor." Accord, Lewis v. Cocks, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 466,
468 (1874) ; Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.)
276 (1874), upholding the exercise of civil jurisdiction by a provost court
established by General Butler at New Orleans, as commander of the occupying army, without express authority from the President; Burke v. Miltenberger, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 519 (1873); Handlin v. Wickliffe, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 173 (1870), upholding the authority of a military governor not only
to appoint judicial officers but also to revoke such appointments. The Court
here, in rejecting a claim for additional judicial compensation, stated: "[T]he
appointment of the relator as judge was purely military, authorized only
by the necessities of military operation, and was subject to revocation whenever, in the judgment of the military governor, revocation, should become
necessary or expedient."
" Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 715-16 (1876). Accord, Ochoa v.
Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913).
"Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 266 (1909).
" Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1952).
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mander-in-Chief of the armed forces, could establish and prescribe
the jurisdiction and procedure of such commissions "interritory
occupied by Armed Forces of the United States." 9
In this procession of cases the Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that a military governor may, and must, provide
an adequate court system for the occupied area; that he may use the
existing local courts if this is practicable, or may establish his own
or use a combination of the two; that he may enforce the existing
law, modify it and supplement it with occupation law promulgated
by proclamation and ordinance; that he may prescribe the procedure
for military government courts; and that this power may not be
used capriciously.
It is interesting to observe that the military government practices
and policies of United States armed forces through the years have
been more conservative than the views expressed by the Supreme
Court. General Scott's military government order issued in Mexico
City in 1847 displayed a genuine interest in preserving and maintaining in operation the Mexican courts."0 That order, though
issued sixty years before article 43 of Hague Convention existed,
acknowledged the duty of the military commander to the local populace to restore law and order.8" It, with considerable care, specified
the jurisdiction of offenses"' and persons" to be exercised by mili, Ibid.

SO GEN. 0. 287, para. 13 (1847), provided: "The administration of justice,
both in civil and criminal matters through the ordinary courts of the country,
shall nowhere and in no degree be interrupted by any officer or soldier of the
American forces, except (1) in cases to which an officer, soldier, agent, servant, or follower of the American Army may be a party; and (2) in political
cases-that is, prosecutions against other individuals on the allegations that
they have given friendly information, aid, or assistance to the American
forces."
" Id. at para. 7, read: "That unwritten code is martial law, as an addition
to the written military code prescribed by Congress in the Rules and Articles
of War, and which unwritten code all armies in hostile countries are forced
to adopt, not only for their own safety, but for the protection of unoffending
inhabitants and their property about the theaters of military operations against
injuries, on the part of the Army, contrary to the laws of war." (Italics in
original.)
Id. at paras. 2 and 3, stated: "Assassination, murder, poisoning, rape,
or the attempt to commit either; malicious stabbing or maiming; malicious
assault and battery, robbery, theft; the wanton desecration of churches,
cemeteries, or other religious edifices and fixtures; the interruption of religious ceremonies and the destruction, except by order of a superior officer,
of public or private property, are such offences. The good of the service,
the honor of the United States, and the interest of humanity imperiously
demand that every crime enumerated above should be severely punished."
" Id. at paras. 9 and 10; these provided: "Accordingly, every crime
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tary commissions and displayed a due process interest in the procedure to be followed.8" As might be expected the provisions of
Francis Lieber's General Order 100 of 1863 introduced refinements. 5 With this background, the mandate of article 43 of the
Hague Convention of 1907 came not as an innovation, but as an
old friend, to American military commanders.8 6
GENEVA CIVILIAN CONVENTION OF

1949

The conventional law of war as to law enforcement has been
further developed by article 64 of the Geneva Convention Relative
enumerated in paragraph No. 2 above, [see note 82 supra] whether committed-(1) by any inhabitant of Mexico, sojourner, or traveler therein, upon
the person or property of any individual of the United States forces, retainer
or follower of the same; (2) by any individual of the said forces, retainer or

follower of the same, upon the person or property of any inhabitant of
Mexico, sojourner or traveler therein; or (3) by any individual of the said
forces, retainer or follower of the same, upon the person or property of any
other individual of the same forces, retainer or follower of the same, shall
be duly tried and punished under the said supplemental code. For this purpose it is ordered that all offenders, in the matters aforesaid, shall be properly
seized, confined, and reported for trial before military commissions . .
(Italics in original.)
" Id. at para. 11, which provided: "Every military commission, under
this order, will be appointed, governed, and limited, as nearly as practicable,

as prescribed by the 65th, 66th, 67th, and 97th of the said Rules and Articles

of War, and the proceedings of such commissions will be duly recorded in
writing, reviewed, revised, disapproved or approved, and the sentences executed-all, as near as may be, as in the cases of the proceedings and sentences
of courts-martial; provided, that no military commission shall try any case
clearly cognizable by any court-martial; and provided, also, that no sentence
of a military commission shall be put in execution against any individual
belonging to this Army which may not be, according to the nature and degree
of the offence, as established by evidence in conformity with known punishments in like cases in some one of the States of the United States of America."
" Typical is paragraph 673 thereof which read: "All civil and criminal
law of the places and territories captured from the enemy shall continue to
take its usual course under military government, unless, in case of absolute
impediment, the same be interrupted or modified by order of the occupying
military power; but all the functions of the hostile government-legislative,
executive or administrative-whether of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under military government, or continue only with the sanction,
or, if deemed necessary, with the participation of the invader. The commander of the occupying forces may proclaim that the administration of all
civil and criminal law shall, either wholly or in part, continue as in time of
peace. The commanding officer may require the magistrates and other civil
officials of the occupied territory to take an oath of temporary allegiance or an
oath of fidelity to the victorious government or rulers, as a condition to the
continuance of their functions. But whether such oath has been taken or not,
the people and their officials owe strict obedience, at the peril of their lives, to
the military government of the occupying power as long as it holds sway
over the district or country."
8' Art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 538 (1907), is set out as para. 363 of
FM 27-10, at 141. It directs: "The authority of the legitimate power having
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to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,
1949.87 This basic article of that Convention provides:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in
force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute
a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the
present Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and
to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of
justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue
to function in respect of all offenses covered by the said laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential
to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under
the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government
of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying
Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces
the establishments and lines
or administration, and likewise of 88
of communication used by them.
The Geneva Civilian Convention, as it is informally known,
contains detailed provisions for the protection of civilians charged
with penal offenses by an occupying power. Many of these were
not previously a part of the law of war, either customarily or conventionally. To a large extent these bring to the law of military
government courts Anglo-American ideas of due process and are
designed to overcome deficiencies which extensive practical experience in the Second World War disclosed. The Senate, by unanimous
vote on July 6, 1955, gave its consent to ratification, and the Convention became the law of the United States on February 2, 1956.89
in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in
the country."
" [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3517, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 [hereinafter cited as
Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365].
The Geneva Civilian
88
id. at 35 58.
89 Baxter, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 Before the United States
Senate, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 551 (1955). The Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949 [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.
3362, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, id. at 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, and the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, id. at 3317, T.I.A.S.
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Articles 65 to 77, inclusive, contain the specific safeguards afforded to civilians charged with crime in military government courts.
There has as yet been no occasion for the United States Supreme
Court to consider these provisions. Accordingly, they fall beyond
the strict scope of this present treatment of the subject. However,
since they are now part of our domestic law, demonstrate the real
development of international law in this respect, and probably will
in the future be subject to Supreme Court litigation, these pertinent
articles are given in Appendix I.
American military directives have been revised to implement the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. In particular, the military government
manual chapter on courts reflects a determination to insure compliance with the provisions of articles 64 through 77.' 0 This is also
true of the revised law of land warfare manual."'
JURISDICTION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT COURTS

The jurisdiction of military government courts generally extends
to the whole of the occupied territory and to all persons within the
occupied area,92 except those treated as prisoners of war under the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
of August 12, 1949. 93 Members of the United States and allied
armed forces usually are not, as a matter of policy, made subject to
the jurisdiction of military government courts except in civil suits.9 4
However, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the
armed forces are sometimes made subject to both the criminal and
civil jurisdiction of such courts. 5
As to offenses, the jurisdiction of military government courts
No. 3364 were enacted into law at the same time. In 1956 when the Geneva

Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, became effective as the law of the

United States, it had by ratification or accession become domestic law in
forty-seven other countries, including the Soviet Union and the communist
block, other than Albania and Red China. Id. at 3694-95, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
A few reservations were made, but these were of minor importance. Albania
has since ratified this Convention. For a list of the seventy nations which
had ratified all four Conventions by 1958, see DRAPER, THE RED CRoss CONAt the end of 1959, seventy-seven nations had ratiVENTION 117-18 (1958).
fied these Conventions; Canada and Red China had not. See INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTE OF THE REn CRoss, ANNUAL RFPoRT 45 (1959).
" JOINT MANUAL

paras. 42-49, at 95-105.

*' FM 27-10 paras. 370-74, at 142-43, set out in Appendix II. Also pertinent2 are id. paras. 432-48, at 158-64.
" JOINT MANUAL paras. 45(a), (b), at 97-98.
" [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3317, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
" JOINT MANUAL

Il Ibid.

para. 45(b), at 98.
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extends to all offenses made punishable by any order, ordinance, or
proclamation issued by the occupation authorities as well as to war
crimes, if other tribunals are not established to try such cases."
Military government courts may also be given jurisdiction to administer the criminal and civil law of an area which is continued
7
in force after the area has been occupied.
It should be noted that United States courts, including the
Supreme Court, do not sit as appellate courts to review the merits
of decisions, either criminal or civil, rendered by military government courts. Monitoring extends only to determining whether military government courts have acted without jurisdiction. This is
limited to habeas corpus proceedings in criminal cases"8 and to collateral attack of civil judgments as being void for want of
jurisdiction. 9
PUBLIC FINANCE

An activity of military government which has generated litigation is that of public finance. It has been held that a military occupant may levy and collect customs duties on goods imported into the
occupied area,' and that such a duty once paid need not again be
" Id. para. 45(c), at 98.

97 Ibid.

" Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 362 (1952). The Court concluded:
"The jurisdiction of the United States Courts of the Allied High Commission
for Germany to try petitioner being established, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals affirming the discharge of the writ of habeas corpus for petitioners'
release from custody is Affirmed." Cf. Ex parte Ortez, 100 Fed. 955 (1900) ;
United States v. Reiter, 27 Fed. Cas. 768 (No. 16146) (Provisional Ct. La.
1865) ; State v. Jarvis, 63 N.C. 556 (1869).
9
Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 716 (1875): "[W]e hold that the
order [of General Canby annulling a court decree of foreclosure] was void."
Cf. Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 267-68 (1909): "The plaintiffs further contend that if the United States Provisional Court had jurisdiction
of the case and the parties, in some way it had lost it, because in the course of
its proceedings it disregarded certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which were binding upon it. But clearly no such question is open on
a collateral attack, such as this is, and we need delay no further upon that
point." See also In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 127 (1900): "This court is
not . . . empowered to review the proceedings of military tribunals by certiorari"; Scott v. Eaton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 382 (1872).
(16 How.) 164 (1853). However, in
1"0 Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S.
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850), it was held that although
Tampico, Mexico was under the exclusive occupation and control of American troops in 1847 it was not a port of the United States and that a vessel
which obtained a coasting manifest at Tampico from the United States acting
collector was still obliged to pay import duties on its cargo upon discharge at
the port of Philadelphia. It does not appear from the opinion that the master

1962]

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

paid to a government thereafter resuming 0 l or acquiring 0 2 sovereignty over the same area. A military governor may withhold a
customs house clearance as a means of enforcing port regulations.0 3
Regular property taxes may be assessed and collected by a military
government.' 4
The Hague Regulations,0

5

which are a part of United States

law, require an occupant, if he collects taxes, to, so far as possible,
do so according to existing rules of assessment and incidence and
to defray therefrom the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory. In addition to these taxes the occupant may levy
money contributions in the occupied territory for the needs of the
army and the administration of the occupied territory,10 6 but only
under written order and on the responsibility of a commander-inchief, and, as far as possible, in accordance with existing rules of
assessment and incidence and every contributor must be given a
07
receipt.'
of the vessel actually paid duty at Tampico. The Court simply held that

the shipment was made.
Tampico was a foreign port when
"0'United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
102 MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416 (1913).
10. United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520 (1875).
oKeely v. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441 (1878); Clegg v. State, 42 Tex. 605

(1875).
oThe Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539, art. 48.
100

Id.at art. 49.
1Id. at art. 51. For an account of contributions levied by Germany in
the First World War, see FEILCHENFELD, TE INTERNATIoNAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OccUPATION 41-46 (1942).
General Scott by his General Order of September 17, 1841, issued at
Mexico City, directed: "[A] contribution of $150,000 is imposed on this
capital, to be paid in four weekly installments of thirty-seven thousand five
hundred dollars ($37,500) each, beginning on Monday next, the 20th instant,
and terminating on Monday, the llth of October. The Ayuntamiento, or
corporate authority of the city, is specially charged with the collection and
payment of the several installments. Of the whole contributions to be paid
over to this Army, twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) shall be appropriated
to the purchase of extra comforts for the wounded and sick in hospital; ninety
thousand dollars ($90,000) to the purchase of blankets and shoes for gratuitous distribution among the rank and file of the Army; and forty thousand
dollars ($40,000) reserved for other necessary military purposes." (Emphasis in original.) This seems to meet the present test of being "for the
needs of the Army," assuming that the amount "reserved for other necessary
military purposes" was in fact used for military purposes of the occupying
force. However, Winthrop, in MILITARY LAW AND PancEDENTs 807 n.23
(1920), in speaking of General Scott's contributions imposed on Mexico,
said: "Scott states in his Autobiography (p. 582), that there actually came
into his hands 'about $220,000,' of which $102,000 was expended for the
benefit of the soldiers, and $118,000 was sent to Washington for the purposes
of the founding of any Army Asylum-the present 'Soldiers' Home.' Strictly,
1
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The military manual provides that if the taxing authorities of
the occupied state have fled or refuse to act the total tax may be
allotted among districts and the municipal authorities required to
collect it. Ordinarily the occupier does not control the collection of
local, as distinguished from national, taxes but may supervise the
expenditure of such local revenue and prevent its hostile use. Contributions may not be levied to enrich the occupant nor to pay the
general war expenses of the occupant other than its occupation costs.
Contributions must be first applied to the cost of administering the
occupied territory if regular taxes do not suffice for this purpose,
08
and only the balance may be used to pay occupation costs.'

It is important to distinguish the occupant's right to collect contributions from his right to requisition 0 9 goods and services for the
maintenance of the army. The occupant need not repay contributions, he must pay for items requisitioned1nO
In the Second World War occupation of West Germany a more
sophisticated and efficient method of procuring from the local economy, at least a part of the "needs of the army" of occupation, was
developed. This system required a high degree of co-operation on
the part of the domestic government, which might not always prevail
in an occupation situation. Direct requisitioning in kind was terminated, as such, early in the occupation. The Potsdam Protocol of
August 1, 1945, provided, "Allied controls shall be imposed upon
the German economy but only to the extent necessary... to assure
the production and maintenance of goods and services required to
meet the needs of the occupying forces . . . in Germany."

The

German government was required to supply free of cost such German currency as the Allies required and to redeem in German
this latter, as being in the nature of an investment of the contribution for the
profit of the Government, was not a legitimate use of the funds." (Emphasis
in original.)
8
..
FM 27-10 paras. 425-29, at 157. FEILCHENFEL, op. Cit. supra note
107, at 48-50, considers the taxation rights of belligerent occupants.
.09
The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539, art. 52, provides:
"Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities
or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall
be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as
not to involve the inhabitants in the obligations of taking part in military
operations against their own country. Such requisitions and services shall
only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied.
Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if not, a
receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be made as
soon as possible." See also FM 27-10 paras. 415-17, at 154.
...
FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 107, at 41.
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currency, free of cost, all holdings in German territory of currencies
issued by the Allies during military operations or occupation and
to defray the costs of provisioning, maintenance, pay, accommodation and transport of the forces and agencies stationed in Germany
by the Allies. This was implemented, so far as the United States
was concerned, by issuing writings which were designated "Requisition Order Demands" and were commonly known as "EC Form
6GAs." These were executed and delivered to suppliers of goods
and services who took them initially to the local Burgemeister, and
later on to the central government occupation cost offices where West
German officials made payment in Deutsch Marks which had been
budgeted for this very purpose. The form expressly provided: "The
serving of EC Form 6GA . . . will not constitute a contract under
U.S., international or German law." This whole procedure was
judicially reviewed and approved by the United States Court of
Claims in denying a German building contractor's claim for extra
costs in constructing an ammunition storage facility. It was held
that no contract right arose against the United States, and that the
claimant was not entitled to more than the amount the United States
architect-engineer had certified was due under the EC Form 6GA
and which had been paid by the West German occupation cost office
in Deutsch Marks."'
This procedure, though the form used the word "requisition,"
technically was not requisitioning at all, but an effective means of
providing occupation costs by a method of contribution which was
completely integrated into the national tax system of the occupied
country. It was both lawful and efficient, but certainly would not
preclude, for the future in different circumstances, other methods of
imposing contributions. The method adopted resulted in a high
degree of co-ordinated co-operation. The title in fee to a real estate
construction, of course, vested in the West German government, and
possession of many facilities constructed under this system has reverted to that government.
1'Best v. United States, 292 F.2d 274, 278 (Ct. Cl. 1961). The court
here observed: "By 1953, a much greater degree of law and order had been
established, and the German money to pay occupation costs was budgeted and
allocated to the zonal authorities in a systematic way. However, any intelligent person knew that the Federal Republic of Germany was still paying
occupation costs to the victorious Allies, though at the same time the United
States, at least, was pouring billions of dollars into Germany, under the
Marshall plan, to rebuild the German economy."
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The Supreme Court has had occasion to approve the right of
an occupant to exact contributions in an occupied area. Speaking
of the United States occupation of Tampico in 1847 the Court
declared:
The custom-house was established in an enemy's country...
as a measure of hostility, and ...

a mode of exacting contri-

butions from the enemy to support our army....

The duties

required . . . were nothing more than contributions levied

upon the enemy, which the usages of war 2justify when an
army is operating in the enemy's country."
Local currency may be left in circulation. The occupying power,
however, may use its own regular currency or issue its own special
occupation currency for use in occupied areas. The American practice of the Second World War was to continue the local currency
for native use and to use occupation dollar currency for purchases
made by American forces personnel in private transactions with
United States sales agencies such as post exchanges and quartermasters sales stores. This was done primarily to curtail black
market activities and to prevent the diversion of "green dollars,"
that is regular United States currency, into hostile hands for use in
espionage and other activities inimical to American interests.
The Supreme Court in upholding the legality of Confederate
notes as the medium of exchange in the Confederacy, had this to say:
[C]onfederate notes were issued early in the war, and these
notes in a short time became almost exclusively the currency
of the insurgent States. As contracts in themselves, except in
the contingency of successful revolution, these notes were
nullities; for, except in that event, there could be no payer.
They bore, indeed, this character upon their face, for they
were made payable only "after the ratification of a treaty of
peace between the Confederate States and the United States
of America." While the war lasted, however, they had a
certain contingent value, and were used as money in nearly
all the business transactions of many millions of people. They
must be regarded, therefore, as a currency, imposed on the
community by irresistible force.
...
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 616 (1850). Accord, Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 97 (1874); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S.

(16 How.) 164, 190 (1853).
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Is seems to follow as a necessary consequence from this actual supremacy of the insurgent government, as a belligerent,
within the territory where it circulated, and from the necessity of civil obedience on the part of all who remained in it,
that this currency must be considered in courts of law in the
same light as if it had been issued by a foreign government,
temporarily occupying a part of the territory of the United
States. Contracts stipulating for payments in this currency,
cannot be regarded for that reason only, as made in aid of the
foreign invasion in the one case, or of the domestic insurrection in the other....
They were the only measure of value which the people
had, and their use was a matter of almost absolute necessity.
And this use gave them a sort of value, insignificant and precarious enough it is true, but always having a sufficiently
definite relation to gold and silver, the universal measures of
value, so that it was always easy to ascertain how much gold
and silver was the real equivalent of a sum expressed in this
currency. 113
The occupant may institute exchange controls to conserve the
monetary assets of the occupied territory. Such measures cannot
be taken however, for the purpose of debasing the local currency or
enriching the occupant.1 4 These powers of the occupant to key
taxes, finance the occupation and control the currency in the occupied
area are based upon the fundamental duty to maintain law and order
which article 43 of the Hague Regulations imposes."1
TREATMENT OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

The use to which an occupying military commander may put the
property of the national government of the enemy state is, with
some preciseness, stated in the conventional laws of war. These
rules probably are more accurately classified as limitations on the
conduct of hostility rather than the exercise of military government.
However, since both areas are the responsibility of the military
... Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1, 11, 13 (1869). Accord,
Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388 (1898); Planters' Bank v. Union Bank, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 483, 503 (1872). Contra, Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 570 (1873), stating that investment in Alabama in Confederate bonds
gave aid and comfort to the enemy and was illegal.
.FM 27-10 para. 430, at 157.
...
FELc ENFELD, op. cit. su*pra note 107, at 49, 62-85.
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commander and the same subordinates on occasion engage in the
performance of both functions, the two tend to become confused.
Only a cursory treatment will be undertaken.
The initial problem is to determine what property is public and
what private. All property of municipalities, and that of religious,
charitable, educational, artistic and scientific institutions, even though
state owned, must be treated as private property and its seizure,
destruction or willful damage is forbidden." 6 Such property may be
requisitioned to quarter troops," 7 store supplies and house vehicles,

but must be secured against all avoidable injury. Religious buildings may be used only for medical installations and then only in
emergency." s Where the status of property is unknown it may be
treated as public. The test of where the loss of beneficial ownership
would fall in event of appropriation is applied to determine whether
the property is public or private." 9
If the property is public, that is government owned above the
municipal level, it must not be destroyed except where rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations. 2 The occupying state
is only an administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real
estate, forests, and agricultural estates situated in and owned by the
occupied country; it does not acquire title and must safeguard such
capital assets.' 2' Forts, arsenals, dockyards, magazines, piers,
wharves, barracks, railways, bridges, airfields and other state facilities of direct military use remain in the possession of the occupant
until the close of the occupation unless sooner released, and may be
destroyed or damaged if necessary to military operations.' 22
Non-military state real property, such as public buildings, parks,
forests, farms, mines and land, cannot be sold by the occupant; nor
in their use may waste be committed. Crops, timber, and ore may
16

The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539, art. 56.
a discussion of the domestic and international legal aspects of
quartering of troops, see Wurfel, Quartering of Troops: The Unlitigated
Third Amendment, 21 TENN. L. REv. 723 (1951).
'

117 For

...
FM 27-10 para. 405, at 152.

"'Id. para. 394, at 149. The property of member states of a federation
is treated as state and not municipal property. FEILCHENFLD, op. cit. supra
note 107, at 57, 104. In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Rogers, 281 F.2d
12 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 927 (1960), currency discovered in a
hiding place on the Island of Negroes was held to be public Japanese
property in the absence of persuasive proof to the contrary.
"0The Geneva Civilian Convention T.I.A.S. No. 3365, art. 53.
"'The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539, art. 56.
.2FM 27-10 para. 401, at 151.
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be used or sold. Public buildings and land may be used or leased.'
In City of New Orleans v. Steanship Co.,'24 the Supreme Court
upheld the rights of a lessee steamship company under a ten-year
lease of waterfront property granted in 1865 by the mayor, board of
finance and board of street landings of New Orleans, all of whom
had been appointed by the commanding general. Though a fair
rental was stipulated and was in fact paid to the re-established city
government, in the present state of the law it is doubtful that this
precedent would be followed. The military manual flatly provides,
"The term of a lease or contract should not extend beyond the
25
conclusion of the war."'
All movable property owned by the occupied state which may
be used for war operations may be taken and utilized by the occupant.
This extends to cash, realizable securities, arms, transport, stores
and supplies; but state owned personalty not susceptible of military
use cannot be appropriated. 26 However, all enemy public personal
property captured by actual seizure on a battlefield or which has been
abandoned and is reduced to possession becomes the property of the
capturing power.2
In case of a total conquest all public property has been held to
vest in the conqueror. 1 28 By a treaty of peace public property is
vested in the new sovereign in case of cession. If there is no change
of sovereignty possession revests in the original sovereign except to
the extent the treaty otherwise provides.
...
Id. para. 402, at 151.
"' 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387 (1874).
FM 27-10 para. 402, at 151.

1

121

Id. para. 404, at 151; The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S.

No. 539, art. 53. Article 31 of the Lieber Code of 1863, in GRABER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 1863-1914, at 312
(1949), provided: "A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes
all public movable property until further direction by its government, and
sequesters for its own benefit or that of its government all the revenues of
real property belonging to the hostile government or nation. The title to
such real property remains in abeyance during military occupation, and until
the conquest is made complete."
127 Oakes v. United States, 174 U.S. 778, 786 (1899); FM 27-10
paras.
395-96, at 150; Downey, Captured Enemy Property: Booty of War and
Seized Enemy Property, 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 488 (1950).
*" United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 414, 434-35 (1872):
"Complete conquest, by whatever mode it may be perfected, carries with it
all the rights of the former government, or in other words, the conqueror, by
the completion of his conquest, becomes the absolute owner of the property
conquered from the enemy, nation, or state. .. ." The Court was here speaking of an iron works which had been owned by the Confederate states.
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TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

The basic rule is that private property cannot be confiscated.
Private property, both real and personal, may be requisitioned, but
receipt must be given and payment made. If private property is a
means of communication or transportation, or consists of arms or
munitions of war, it may be seized, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made."'u Thus where three private
steamers and their crews were taken by Union quartermaster officers for transport use on the Mississippi River under claim of imperative military necessity during the Civil War it was held that
the owner could recover the reasonable value of their use which
was in excess of what had already been paid. 8 0 Similarly, a railroad
may collect its regular freight rates for military supplies transported
81
in a combat zone.'
Other private property may be destroyed or damaged only if
absolutely necessary to military operations. Thus where a military
commander compelled a civilian sutler, against his will, to accompany the army from San Elisorio to Chihauhau, Mexico, where his
stock of merchandise was captured by the Mexicans, the Supreme
Court held that this taking of private property was not compelled
by military necessity and that the officer who required it was personally liable for its value.' 3 2 This last situation is to be distinguished from the one where a military commander in combat, to
prevent private property susceptible of military use from falling into
2.9
The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539, arts. 46(2), 5253. Article 46(2) of this Convention was cited and applied in The Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455, 463 (2d Cir. 1953). See
generally Jessup, A Belligerent Occupant's Power over Property, 38 Am. J.
INT'L L. 457 (1944).
...
United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871). The Court
stated: "Such a taking of private property by the government, when the
emergency of the public service in time of war or impending public danger
is too urgent to admit of delay, is everywhere regarded as justified, if the
necessity for the use of the property is imperative and immediate, and the
danger, as heretofore described, is impending, and it is equally clear that the
taking of such property under such circumstances creates an obligation on
the part of the government to reimburse the owner to the full value of the
service. Private rights, under such extreme and imperious circumstances,
must give way for the time to the public good, but the government must make
full restitution for the sacrifice." Id. at 629. Accord, Phelps v. United
States, 274 U.S. 341 (1927).
...
United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
1.. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 115 (1851); cf. Planters'
Bank v. Union Bank, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 483 (1872).
See generally
Downey, The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 Am. J. INT', L. 251
(1953).
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the hands of the enemy, destroys it. Under these circumstances the
Supreme Court has held that the destruction of railway bridges,'
petroleum bulk plant facilities... and petroleum supplies 35 is not
compensable and that the owner suffers the loss as a fortune of war.
Similarly, recovery was denied for the destruction of buildings in a
combat area in Cuba ordered as a health measure to prevent the
Conversely,
spread of yellow fever among American troops. 8
where through military necessity structures are erected on private
property, the government may not charge or offset the value thereof
against the land owner. 137 Requisitioned real estate must be returned, after use, to the private owner.3
The judicial rule which seems to emerge from these cases is that
the government must pay for private property seized to prosecute the
war, but need not pay for private property destroyed as a last resort
to keep it from being of military use to the enemy.
CAPTURED

ENEMY

PROPERTY

The older term for captured enemy property was "war booty."
Both private and public property actually captured on the battlefield
or abandoned are according to the current military manual subject
to seizure and become the property of the capturing government. 3 9
This is accomplished only by actual seizure, or posting of a guard
immediately after successful combat in the case of bulky property,
and does not apply to private property found in the possession of
It is most doubtful whether private property not of
individuals. 4
immediate military use may be captured even when found on a
battlefield. 4 '
At this juncture, some mention of the Civil War cotton seizure
cases is necessary. In this particular area the federal government
and its courts proceeded as though they were dealing with civil war
rebels and not with the rights of civilian nationals of a lawful bel...
United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
' United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
13 Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 605, 122 F.
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 926 (1955).
Supp. 830 (1954),
22 Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1908).
137 United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
138 FM 27-10 para 407, at 152.
...
Id. para. 396, at 150.
Id. para. 395, at 150.
z" FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 107, at 39; Downey, supra note 127,
at 494; see BisHop, INTERNATIONAL LAw CASES AND MATERIALS 792 (2d ed.
1962).
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ligerent in an international war. 142 Charles Cheney Hyde, in discussing the confiscation acts, aptly said, "it may be doubted whether
the decisions interpreting acts of Congress serve as useful precedents
respecting the extent of the rights of a belligerent occupant under the
43
law of nations."1
The Supreme Court, in upholding these seizures as a legitimate
practice held that cotton was enemies' property liable to capture and
confiscation by the adverse party as a special case because it "constituted the chief reliance of the rebels for means to purchase the
munitions of war in Europe," and that the capture was justified by
legislation. 44 Ten years later, in 1875, the Court reaffirmed this
view in holding that a former owner had no cause of action against
the treasury agent who had received cotton from military authorities
who seized it in Georgia in December 1865.4n The Court then gave
as an additional reason that the whole insurgent territory was a
battlefield. Characterizing all Confederate territory as a "battlefield," particularly when resistance had collapsed, appears to have
been an unwarranted fiction.

In view of the protection to private property now afforded by
the law of war it is unlikely that in an international occupation these
post Civil War decisions would be considered applicable precedents.
However, the technique of appointing conservators to manage the
property of absent or hostile persons in occupied areas is still valid,
but such property must be accounted for and returned to the owner
14
when the risk of its hostile use no longer exists.

It should be observed that the title to captured or seized enemy
property, public or private, vests in the occupying government and
not in any soldier or other individual person. 4 7 Pillaging, that is
the forcible taking of private property by an invading army from
142

GRABER, op.

cit. supra note 126, at 282.

...
HYDE,

INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES 1893-94 (2d ed. 1945).

' Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404 (1865); cf. Miller v.
United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870).
' Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187 (1875); accord, Ford v. Surget, 97
U.S. 594 (1878).
14" FM 27-10 para. 399, at 150; cf. The Netherlands v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953). See generally Freeman, Military
Government Property Laws in Occupied Germany, 37 KY. L.J. 45 (1948).
""FM 27-10 para. 396, at 150. This principle was stated in Lamar v.
Browne, 92 U.S. 187, 195 (1875). See generally Downey, supra note 127, at
499.
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enemy subjects, is forbidden by both the Hague 4 ' and Geneva Conventions. 49 The personal property of a prisoner of war, other than
his arms, military equipment and military documents must not be
seized. Prisoners of war must be permitted to retain gas masks
and protective helmets until removed to areas where these are unnecessary. Where personal property is taken from prisoners receipts
must be given and strict accounting made. 50
Any member of the armed forces who engages in looting or
pillaging is subject to trial by court-martial. 151 Persons engaging
in such conduct, whether military or civilian, are guilty of a violation
of the law of war and must be prosecuted therefor. This was clearly
established at the Nuremberg trial,15 2 and had previously been declared to be the law by the United States Supreme Court.5 3 Not
only are the direct perpetrators criminally liable, but a military
governor who permits such activities incurs personal criminal responsibility for such conduct. 54
The ultimate disposition of captured enemy property is a question of domestic law. The Constitution expressly provides that
"" The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539, arts. 28, 47.
Article 28 states: "The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault,
is prohibited."
"The Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, art. 33.
"'0The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3317, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
See generally Levie, Prisonersof War and the Protecting Power, 55 Am. J.
INT'L L. 374 (1961).

..Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 903 (1958), provides:
"(a) All persons subject to this chapter shall secure all public property taken
from the enemy for the service of the United States, and shall give notice
and turn over to the proper authority without delay all captured or abandoned property in their possession, custody, or control. (b) Any person
subject to this chapter who-(1) fails to carry out the duties prescribed in
subsection (a); (2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes
of captured or abandoned property, whereby he received or expects any
profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another directly or indirectly connected with himself; or (3) engages in looting or pillaging; shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct."
...
Rosenberg Case, Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, 22 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 539, 540-41 (1948).

re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946).
..Ibid. After pointing out that the bills of particulars alleged a series of
153In

deliberately planned acts of destruction of public, private and religious

property by members of the forces under petitioner's command, the Court
held that The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539, and the
Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, imposed upon the petitioner
an affirmative duty to take such measures as were appropriate and within his

power to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population from such
depredations.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Congress shall "make rules concerning captures on land and
water."' 55 This applies to enemy property located in the United
States and seized there in time of war, as well as to that taken in a
foreign occupied area. Chief Justice Marshall, in declaring invalid
a seizure of lumber, which was cargo from a vessel under charter to
British merchants, taken in the United States during the War of
1812, stressed the fact that control of enemy property was committed
primarily to the Congress and not to the courts. His lucid opinion
set the pattern by which Congress has regulated this difficult matter.
In part he said:
The modern rule, then, would seem to be, that tangible
property belonging to an enemy and found in the country at
the commencement of war, ought not to be immediately confiscated; and in almost every commercial treaty, an article is
inserted stipulating for the right to withdraw such property.
This rule appears to be totally incompatible with the idea,
that war does of itself vest the property in the belligerent
government. It may be considered as the opinion of all who
have written on the jus belli, that war gives the right to confiscate, but does not itself confiscate the property of the enemy;
and their rules go to the exercise of this right....
Commercial nations, in the situation of the United States,
have always a considerable quantity of property in the possession of their neighbors. When war breaks out, the question, what shall be done with enemy property, in our country,
is a question rather of policy than of law. The rule which
we apply to the property of our enemy, will be applied by
him to the property of our citizens. Like all other questions
of policy, it is proper for the consideration of a department
which can modify it at will; not for the consideration of a
department which can pursue only the law as it is written.
It is proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of the
executive or judiciary....
It appears to the court, that the power of confiscating
1

U.S. Cocsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. But see Jessup, Enemy Property, 49
Am. J. IN'eL L. 57 (1955), suggesting that the question is ultimately one
for determination by international law by an international tribunal. How-

ever, in a Trading with the Enemy Act case the Supreme Court in 1947
said: "Unquestionably to wage war successfully, the United States may
confiscate enemy property." Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469,
475 (1947).
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enemy property is in the legislature, and that the legislature
has not yet declared its will to confiscate property which was
within our territory at the declaration of war. The court is,
therefore, of the opinion, that there is error in the sentence of
condemnation pronounced in the circuit court in this case,
and doth direct that the same be reversed." 6
The interesting problems arising under the Trading With the
Enemy Act'e7 are beyond the scope of military government. Suffice
it to say this comprehensive statute endeavors to maintain the delicate political balance so astutely discerned by Chief Justice Marshall.
PERSONAL RIGHTS

The preservation of legitimate personal rights of the inhabitants
of an occupied area is a task of military government as a part of
its broad responsibility to re-establish and maintain law and order.
Since it has been held a military governor himself becomes a war
criminal if he permits the personal rights of civilian inhabitants to
be violated 5 " this is likely to be a matter of lively concern to future
military governors and military governments. Other than the customary law of humanity applicable to the conduct of war, the basic
rule is stated in article 46 of the Hague Convention that "family
honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well
as religious convictions and practices must be respected."' 5 9
Based largely upon the experiences of the Second World War,
and the war crimes trials resulting therefrom, the conventional international protection of personal rights in occupied territory was
expressly stated at some length in the Geneva Convention of 1949.10
1" Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125, 128-29 (1814).
See also United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86 (1833).
'"40 Stat. 411 (1917), 50 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), Cummings v. Deutsche
Bank & Discontogesellschaft, 300 U.S. 115 (1937); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255
U.S. 239 (1921) (upholding constitutionality of the act); Central Union
Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946). "[T]he purpose of the law
of war to . . . protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could
with impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection. Hence
the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the
control of the operations of the war by commanders who are to some extent
responsible for their subordinates." Rosenberg Case, judgment of Oct. 1,
1946, 22 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAjOR WAR
CRIMINALS 539 (1948).
""The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539.
The Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
...
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Succinctly, this Convention provides for protection against all acts
of violence or threats thereof; especially in the case of women, against
rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault; for
equal treatment without regard to race, religion or political opinion;6" for reasonable access to protected persons by delegates of
protecting powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and
representatives of other organizations whose object is to give spiritual aid or material relief;16 the prohibition of the use of physical
or moral coercion against protected persons, in particular to obtain
information from them or from third persons ;163 and express prohibitions against punishment for offenses not personally committed,
collective penalties, reprisals against person or property and the
taking of hostages.'
The prohibitions against reprisals and the
taking of hostages mark definite affirmative progress in the expansion of the principle of humanity as a substantive part of the law
of war.
Also expressly prohibited is the taking of any measure to cause
physical suffering or extermination, not only murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, medical or scientific experiments not
necessitated by treatment, but also any measure of brutality whether
applied by civilian or military agents. "5 The Buchenwald and other
extermination center operations, which violated the law of humanity
when perpetrated, have now emerged from the status of "common
law" offenses and become "statutory" offenses at the international
bar of justice. No possible doubt remains that such conduct is illegal.
Even those who were most critical of war crimes prosecutions seem
to have no quarrel with this salutary strengthening of the substance
of international criminal law. We should be ever mindful that before
Nuremberg, before the 1949 Geneva Conventions and long before the
Eichman trial in Israel, the United States Supreme Court in the
Yamashita case had given definitive civil judicial approval to the
basic proposition that murder is murder without regard to the
nationality of the perpetrator and victim and without regard to
where it occurs.
12
...
Id. at art. 27.
Id. at art. 30.
168
Id. at art. 31.
...
Id. at arts. 33-34. See also JOINT MANUAL para. 7(c) (2), at 16.
...
The Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, art. 32. See also

22

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMITRIBUNAL 494-96 (1948)

NAIs BEFORE THE INTERNAXIONAL MILITARY

(medical experiments).
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Preserved to the belligerent occupant is the right to take control and security measures necessary to prevent acts of hostility by
inhabitants from undermining the military position of the occupier.' 66
This extends to the imposition of curfews, travel and business restrictions, censorship, 167 and as to particularly hostile or powerful
individuals assigned residence or internment' 68 Where internment
is resorted to the Convention prescribes in detail the humane treatment to be accorded internees.' 69 These provisions are more liberal
7
than the rights accorded under the Prisoners of War Convention. 1
The mere presence of civilians does not render an area immune
from military operations. 71 ' This simply means that civilians who
present themselves in combat areas or remain in the immediate
vicinity of military targets such as railroad yards or munitions plants
do so at their peril. The death or injury of such persons incident
to bona fide combat or efforts to destroy such military targets is
not a violation of the law of war.
The litigation and criminal defense rights afforded to individual
civilians in occupied territory have previously been discussed under
the heading of Law Enforcement.
Special attention is given to the problem of enforced labor by
inhabitants for the occupying force. The Convention states, "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected
persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying
Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive."' 72 This is, of course, directed
against "slave labor" practices of the type prosecuted at Nuremberg
as war crimes and crimes against humanity. 7 3 Temporary movement of non-combatants to evacuate an area for their own protection
or for imperative military reasons is not prohibited, but cannot be
beyond the occupied country, and the power undertaking such a
The
Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, art. 27.
...
M727-10 paras. 375-78, at 143-44.
1 8 Id. para. 433, at 158; The Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, art. 78.
...
The Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, arts. 79-135.
170 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
Aug. 12, 1949 [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3317,
171 Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, art. 28.
1 Id.art. 49.
Typical are Rosenberg Case, Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, 22 INTERNATIONAL

MILITARY

TRIBUNAL,

TRIAL

OF THE

BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

Case, Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, id. at 566.

MAJOR WAR

CRIMINALS

539 (1948), and Sauckel

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 40

movement is responsible that it be done under satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety, sanitation and non-separation of
families. The transfer of parts of its own civilian population into
17 4
the occupied territory by the occupying power is prohibited.
Regarding labor the Convention provides:
The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons
to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or
propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is
permitted.
The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons
to work unless they are over eighteen years of age, and then
only on work which is necessary either for the needs of the
army of occupation, or for the public utility services, or for
the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation or health of
the population of the occupied country. Protected persons
may not be compelled to undertake any work which would involve them in the obligation of taking part in military operations. The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to employ forcible means to ensure the security of the
installations where they are performing compulsory labour.
The work shall be carried out only in the occupied territory where the persons whose services have been requisitioned
are. Every such person shall, so far as possible, be kept in
his usual place of employment. Workers shall be paid a fair
wage and the work shall be proportionate to their physical
and intellectual capacities. The legislation in force in the
occupied country concerning working conditions, and safeguards as regards, in particular, such matters as wages, hours
of work, equipment, preliminary training and compensation
for occupational accidents and diseases, shall be applicable
to the protected persons assigned to the work referred to in
this Article.
In no case shall requisition of labour lead to a mobilization
of workers in an organization of a military or semi-military
character.

1 5
7

'"The Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, art. 49.
Article
23 of The Hague Convention No. IV Annex, T.S. No. 539, reads: "A bel-

ligerent is ...forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take
part in the operations of war directed against their own country ...

""Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, art. 51.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

This prohibition extends to the construction of fortifications,
entrenchments and military airfields, but not to the repair of existing
road, bridge and rail facilities. It prohibits the transportation of
Also proammunition or supplies in the zone of operations. 7
hibited are all measures to create unemployment or restrict work
opportunities in occupied territory to induce workers to work for
the occupying power. 7 Bona fide volunteers may be employed.
Voluntary employment for all purposes has been the normal method
of obtaining local labor so far as United States occupation forces
have been concerned.
Normally the best interests of the local inhabitants will be served
if they continue their usual employment. Accordingly, the United
States military government manual provides, "Inhabitants should be
instructed that they must continue or resume their usual employment, unless specifically directed to the contrary. They will assist
in the maintenance of law and order and restoration of normal eco78
nomic conditions."'
The Convention obligates the occupying power to co-operate with
local authorities in facilitating the work of all institutions devoted
to the care and education of children, 179 medical, hospital and public
health establishments 8 0 and to permit ministers of religion to give
spiritual assistance to their adherents.' 8 1 The occupying power shall
co-operate with all relief operations for the benefit of the population
of the occupied territory undertaken by the International Red Cross
or comparable impartial humanitarian organizations or the protect82

ing power..

Relief consignments shall be, in general, tax exempt and transported free of charge. They should also be subject to the right of
inspection and distributed under the supervision and operation of
impartial humanitarian organizations or the protecting power. Individual relief consignments shall be delivered to the intended recipients. Separate relief measures shall not relieve the occupying
power of its humanitarian obligations to the inhabitants. 88
Article 55 of this Convention imposes an affirmative duty of
'*s
'9

FM 27-10 paras. 419-20, at 155.
Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, art. 52.
The Geneva
MANUAL para. 39(e) (6), at 92.
JOINT

No. 3365, art. 50.
The Geneva Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S.
181
Id. art. 58.
188
Id. arts. 60-63.
Id. art. 59.

'so
Id. art. 55.
82
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care on the part of an occupying power not previously required by
the law of war. It provides:
To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the
Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and
medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular,
bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other
articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.
The Occupying Power may not requisition foodstuffs,
articles or medical supplies available in the occupied territory,
except for use by the occupation forces and administration
personnel, and then only if the requirements of the civilian
population have been taken into account. Subject to the provisions of other international Conventions, the Occupying
Power shall make arrangements to ensure that fair value is
paid for any requisitioned goods.
The Protecting Power shall, at any time, be at liberty to
verify the state of the food and medical supplies in occupied
territories, except where temporary restrictions are made
necessary by imperative military requirements.
This brings the welfare state philosophy to the law of belligerent
occupation. It sets a high standard. If taken seriously, as it should
be, it imposes such a penalty on a military occupation of an underdeveloped area as to preclude such an undertaking.
One cannot deny that, in the eyes of the law, the application of
the principle of humanity to the rights of civilians in time of war
has made vast gains since the American Civil War, and even since
the Second World War. It is ironical that just as the legal rights
of civilians against war depredations reach a civilized status, the
hazards of destruction as incidental victims of nuclear weaponry
directed against massive military targets causes civilian jeopardy
to be greater than ever before, and may possibly obliterate the traditional distinction between combatants and non-combatants. These
progressive challenges to the rule of law must be accepted, and man's
genius for achieving lawful solution of problems must outstrip man's
self-destructive ingenuity.
It is to be hoped that United States and other courts will have
little or no future occasion to apply legal sanctions for violations of
personal rights of civilians by combatants or occupation forces. Im-
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plicit in such cases is a background of aggressive war, oppressive
occupation and lawless acts of violence against innocent persons
which is unpleasant to contemplate. However, an adequate legal
system must be prepared to cope with all possible contingencies. It
should be a source of satisfaction that this area of personal rights
vindication has progressed from self-help, through diplomatic representations, to effective penal sanctions. It is perhaps not too much
to hope that ultimately the equivalent of an international wrongful
death statute combined with the application to offending nations of
the doctrine of respondeat superior will add civil penalties so heavy
that such conduct will be not only inhuman and criminal but decidedly unprofitable. It is well that the basic norms are now specifically formulated in a body of law available to all courts, and
definitively binding on most which may possibly be called to sit in
judgment in such matters.
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

The older view that the inhabitants of an area, upon its military
occupation, were obliged to transfer their allegiance to the occupying
power 8 4 no longer prevails. Article 45 of the Hague Convention
of 1907 tersely states: "It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of
occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power." The
duty of the inhabitant is to refrain from acts of unlawful belligerency
and to obey the proclamations and ordinances of the military government which conform to the laws of war.' 5 The policy of United
States military government operations is to announce by proclamation that a military governor has been appointed, that political ties
with, and obligations to the enemy government are suspended, that
the inhabitants will be required to obey the orders of the military
government and to abstain from all acts or words of hostility or
disrespect to the occupying forces, that those who commit offenses
will be punished, and that the inhabitants will be protected in their
persons, property, family rights, religion and employment." 6
Legal steps have been taken to insure that the protections given
by the laws of war cannot be dissipated by interim political activity
'",

United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).

...
For a discussion of the obligation of inhabitants, see Baxter, The Duty
of Obedience to the Belligerent Occupant, 27 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 235, 256

(1950).

...JOINT MANUAL

paras. 39(e) (3), (5), at 91.
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Article 47 of the Geneva

Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not
be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the
benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced,
as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territory and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by
the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory. 187
The occupying power may remove judges and other public
officials from their posts, but if it does not do so, it may not alter
their status, or apply sanctions, or coerce or discriminate against
them if they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of
conscience.1 8" Public utility, health, transportation and other employees of activities essential to the domestic economy may be required to function.
Each official continuing in office may be required to take an oath
to perform his duties conscientiously. If he refuses he may be
removed from office. In any event so long as such an official functions he owes a strict duty of obedience to the occupant. Those who
are continued in office and perform actual duties will be paid from
the public revenues of the occupied territory. 9 It is American
policy to continue local as distinguished from national officials in
office in the absence of specific reason for removal. 9 Officials, however, possess no vested interest in their office even where under the
displaced government it was in perpetuity, and it is within the
18 Geneva
188 Id. art.

Civilian Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, art. 47.

54.

"'FM 27-10 paras. 423-24, at 156.
.
In Ketchum v. Buckley, 99
...JOINT M-xuAx para. 39(e) (4), at 91.
U.S. 188 (1878), it was contended by the sureties on the bond of a general

administrator for Mobile County, Alabama, that they were exonerated by
reason of the appointment of a military governor in Alabama in 1865, and
that this rendered void the letters of administration previously issued by
Alabama under the Confederacy. In rejecting this contention, the Court
declared: "The appointment by the President of a military governor for the
State at the close of hostilities did not of itself change the general laws then
in force for the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, and did not
remove from office those who were at the time charged by law with public
duties in that behalf. It is not alleged that the governor after his appointment undertook by any positive act to remove McGuire from the position he
occupied as general administrator." Id. at 190.

19621
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power of the military governor to abolish the office. 1 ' The military
governor may set aside individual official acts of a public officer
or board.9 2
The avowed ultimate objective of the United States in an occupation is not conquest but "to leave behind government oriented in
Western democratic principles and which will not be a threat to
future peace and world stability."'9 3 Maximum political freedom
consistent with military security and public order will normally be
allowed.
Judicial recognition has been given to the legality of political
objectives of military government. In affirming a treason conviction and rejecting a contention that United States military occupation authorities in Austria made an unreasonable search of the
quarters of an American civilian who had been engaged in treasonous
broadcasting activities for Germany the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit said:
On August 1, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting under
authority delegated by the President as Commander in Chief,
Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1910). The Court
stated: "When the United States, in the progress of the war with Spain, took
firm, military possession of Porto Rico, and the sovereignty of Spain over
191

that Island and its inhabitants and their property was displaced, the United
States, the new Sovereign, found that some persons claimed to have purchased, to hold in perpetuity, and to be entitled, without regard to the public
will, to discharge the duties of certain offices or positions which were not
strictly private positions in which the public had no interest. They were
offices of a quasi-public nature, in that the incumbents were officers of courts,
and in a material sense connected with the administration of justice in tribunals created by government for the benefit of the public. It is inconceivable that the United States, when it agreed in the Treaty not to impair the
property or rights of private individuals, intended to recognize, or to feel
itself bound to recognize, the salability of such positions in perpetuity, or to
so restrict its sovereign authority that it could not, consistently with the
Treaty, abolish a system that was entirely foreign to the conceptions of the
American people, and inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions ...
If, originally, the claimant lawfully purchased, in perpetuity, the office of
Solicitor (Procurador) and held it when Porto Rico was acquired by the
United States, he acquired and held it subject, necessarily, to the power of
the United States to abolish it whenever it conceived that the public interest
demanded that to be done." The Court therefore held that abolition of the
office of the petitioner violated no constitutional provision or any right of
property which the petitioner could assert against the United States.
...
State ex reL O'Hara v. Heath, 20 La. Ann. 518 (1868): "The entering
into the [street cleaning] contract with the realtor by the city officials, was
the exercise of official power. The military commander of the District, we
have seen, was clothed with authority to suspend these officials from exercising official powers; and if so, he clearly had the right to control their
official action, to suspend, modify or supersede it."
...JOINT MANUAL

para. 7(b), at 15.
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had issued a directive to General Mark W. Clark, as Commanding General of U.S. forces of occupation in Austria,
investing him with "supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority in the areas occupied by forces under your
command. . .

."

[P]aragraph 4a stated: "You will be

chiefly concerned in the initial stages of military government with the elimination of German domination and Nazi
influences. Consistently with this purpose, you will be guided
in every step by the necessity to ensure the reconstruction of
Austria as a free, independent and democratic state." In
paragraph 4b General Clark was directed to make clear to
the Austrian people that the military occupation was intended
"to eliminate Nazism, Pan-Germanism, militarism, and other
forces opposed to the democratic reconstruction of Austria"
and "to cooperate with the Control Council for Germany in
the application and enforcement of measures designed to prevent the recurrence of German aggression." Paragraph 5a
directed that every effort be made to prevent the reconstitution of the Nazi party or affiliated associations "in underground, disguised or secret form." In paragraph 5d of the
directive it was provided: "Property, real and personal,
owned or controlled by the Nazi Party, its formations,
affiliated associations and supervised organizations, and by
all persons subject to arrest under the provisions of paragraph 7 below, and found within your zone will be taken
under your control pending a decision by the Allied Council
or higher authority as to its eventual disposition." Paragraph 7b of the directive ordered to be arrested and held in
custody all persons "who if permitted to remain at large
would endanger the accomplishment of your objectives", including any national of any of the United Nations or associated states "who is believed to have committed offenses
under his national law in support of the German war effort."
It was under the foregoing authority that Best was taken
into custody. The search of the Vienna apartment was not
incidental to the arrest, which had occurred earlier and at
another place, but was also conducted under authority of the
directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.1" 4
...
Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 139 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied,

340 U.S. 939 (1951), rehearingdenied, 341 U.S. 907 (1951).
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There is no question that a military government has wide powers
of "legislation" for the government of the occupied area which may
be exercised by the direct issuance of proclamations and ordinances
in the name of the military commander, or by a control council or
a high commission and that such powers may be exercised jointly
where two or more allied nations participate in an occupation.' 9 5
Such powers were extensively exercised in Japan and to even a wider
extent in West Germany following the Second World War.
However, when a military government becomes largely preoccupied with legislation this is likely to be the harbinger of its
early demise. By its very nature military government is not a
permanent institution. One of its primary functions is to hasten its
own liquidation. In the heat of combat one somehow rarely finds
even an observer from the State Department or other civilian agency
of the government present. Not until bullets no longer fly, and it
becomes abundantly apparent that they will not fly again, and that
all is safe, do our civilian contingents appear and take up the burden
of government relieving the military from this responsibility. Such
civilian take-overs have consistently been on the leisurely side. This
has given rise to interesting litigation as to when military government legally terminates. So much so, in fact, that this subject merits
separate consideration.
WHEN MILITARY GOVERNMENT TERMINATES

Everyone seems to agree that while combat rages, or threatens
immediate resumption, military government prevails in the occupied
area. The contention that military government jurisdiction ceases
upon the surrender of the last general opposing the occupying power,
that is upon the cessation of actual hostilities, has been judicially
rejected.' 9 6
Ferguson, Military Government Property Laws in Occupied Germany,
...
37 Ky. L.J. 45 (1948) ; Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant
Under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 YALE L.J. 393 (1945).
... Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 178 (1857). See
also Burke v. Miltenberger, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 519, 524 (1873), where it
was said: "The duration of the court was limited to the restoration of civil
authority in the State, and it is insisted that this limitation expired when the
last Confederate general, Kirby Smith, surrendered, which was on the 26th
of May, 1865; but this position is inconsistent with the fact conceded on
the argument, that military rule prevailed in the city of New Orleans, and
the State of Louisiana, for a long time after this event, and after the sale in
controversy was made. This in itself is conclusive proof that civil authority
was not then restored, and that the Provisional Court was in the rightful
exercise of its jurisdiction."
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Historically wars have been terminated by treaties of peace which
either ceded the territory in question to the conqueror or restored
it to the vanquished upon certain terms such as the payment of
indemnity. In theory, rights and status were all expressly determined in the treaty and its effective date would, at the latest, mark
the close of military government. This was in an era when, though
communications and travel were slow, peace treaties were achieved
with considerable dispatch. In 1828, in upholding the jurisdiction
of a civil court established in Florida by its territorial legislature,
Chief Justice Marshall expressed the traditional view in these words:
The usage of the world is, if a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere
military occupation, until its fate shall be determined at the
treaty of peace. If it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition
is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the
nation to which it is annexed; either on the terms stipulated
in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new master shall
impose. On such transfer of territory, it has never been held,
that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo
any change. Their relations with their former sovereign
are dissolved, and new relations are created between them
and the government which has acquired their territory. The
same Act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law, which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that
which regulates the intercourse, and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly created
97
power of the State.1

Mexican and Spanish war experience disclosed however that
the stately pace of Congress in creating and implementing territorial
governments did not meet the need of the inhabitants to have a
functioning government in the interim period between a treaty of
cession and the actual establishment of civil territorial government.
The Supreme Court approved military government as the only practical solution. It reviewed and reaffirmed the validity of interim
military government after a treaty of peace in Santiago v. Nogueras,19 8 where it said:
...
American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542-43
(1828).
214 U.S. 260, 263-66 (1909).
'-8
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By the ratifications of the treaty of peace, Porto Rico
ceased to be subject to the crown of Spain and became subject
to the legislative power of Congress. But the civil government of the United States cannot extend immediately and
of its own force over conquered and ceded territory. Theoretically, Congress might prepare and enact a scheme of civil
government to take effect immediately upon the cession, but,
practically, there always have been delays and always will be.
Time is required for a study of the situation and for the
maturing and enacting of an adequate scheme of civil government. In the meantime, pending the action of Congress, there
is no civil power under our system of government, not even
that of the President as civil executive, which can take the
place of the government which has ceased to exist by the
cession. Is it possible that, under such circumstances, there
must be an interregnum? We think clearly not. The
authority to govern such ceded territory is found in the laws
applicable to conquest and cession. That authority is the
military power, under the control of the President as Commander-in-Chief.
In the present century, wars, so far as the United States is concerned, have terminated not by treaties of cession but by the gradual
vesting of full governmental powers over the occupied areas in
successor governments to the original sovereign state. Such return
of governmental function has not necessarily coincided with a treaty
of peace. In West Germany there has been no military government
since the Bonn Conventions' 99 became operative on May 5, 1955,
but there is still no peace treaty due to the inability of the powers
concerned to resolve the political problem of a divided Germany.
The executive branch of government, in its conduct of international
relations, has, with the approval of Congress, entered into conventions and agreements which have accomplished most of the things
which would traditionally have been embodied in a treaty of peace.
NATO Status of Forces Agreements 20 0 have completely replaced
...
Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal
Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954 [1955] 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 4117, T.I.A.S.
No. 03425.
North Atlantic Treaty, June 19, 1951 [1953] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1792,
T.I.A.S. No. 2846.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

any remains of military government both in Japan2 01 and West
Germany. 0 2 In Japan this followed a security treaty, in West Germany it came before any treaty. That military government may
be terminated by agreement between an occupying power and a
domestic government acceptable to it appears clearly to be a matter
of political decision not necessarily tied to a treaty of peace and one
in which the judiciary will not substitute its judgment for that of
the other branches of government.
There remains the difficult status which exists where territory
which continues to be occupied is neither ceded nor relinquished and
the treaty of peace does not determine the matter. In rejecting a
contention that the Federal Torts Claims Act20 8 is applicable in
the Rytkyu Islands this situation has been judicially considered.2 0 4
'"The sequence of these events is related in Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S.
524, 527-30 (1957): "A Security Treaty between Japan and the United
States, signed September 8, 1951, was ratified by the Senate on March 20,
1952, and proclaimed by the President effective April 28, 1952. Article III
of the Treaty authorized the making of Administrative Agreements between
the two Governments concerning '[t]he conditions which shall govern the
disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about
Japan .

. . .'

Expressly acting under this provision, the two Nations, on

February 28, 1952, signed an Administrative Agreement covering, among
other matters, the jurisdiction of the United States over offenses committed
in Japan by members of the United States armed forces, and providing that
jurisdiction in any case might be waived by the United States. This Agreement became effective on the same date as the Security Treaty (April 28,
1952) and was considered by the Senate before consent was given to the
Treaty... In the light of the Senate's ratification of the Security Treaty
after consideration of the Administrative Agreement, which had already
been signed, and its subsequent ratification of the NATO Agreement, with
knowledge of the commitment to Japan under the Administrative Agreement, we are satisfied that the approval of Article III of the Security Treaty
authorized the making of the Administrative Agreement and the subsequent
Protocol embodying the NATO Agreement provisions governing jurisdiction
to try criminal offenses ....

The issue for our decision is therefore nar-

rowed to the question whether, upon the record before us, the Constitution
or legislation subsequent to the Security Treaty prohibited the carrying out
of this provision authorized by the Treaty for waiver of the qualified jurisdiction granted by Japan. We find no constitutional or statutory barrier to
the provision as applied here. In the absence of such encroachments, the
wisdom of the arrangement is exclusively for the determination of the Executive 0and
Legislative Branches."
2
2 THE STATus OF

NATO FORCES

IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-

(1959) (supplementary agreement of August 3, 1959).
"'28
U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1958).
0
.,Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1957). It is
there said: "The Treaty cannot be considered as anything more than a transitional arrangement, and for our purpose it is not a conclusive test that under
the Treaty attributes of sovereignty can be exercised for the time being by
the United States. This may indeed be the arrangement effected in order
to maintain public order until a final disposition of the islands shall have
MANY
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The court held only that the Ryukyu Islands have not ceased to be
foreign. Implicit in this determination is the corollary that the
government functioning there is a military government. It seems
probable that acts of that government if attacked in United States
courts would be upheld if otherwise conforming to the laws of
belligerent occupation.
The Supreme Court has decided that the United States as a belligerent occupant may conduct its occupation government through
a civilian agency and civilians, as well as through military authorities
and military personnel, if the executive so determines and the legislative branch does not intervene. °5 It seems unlikely that the
Supreme Court would strike down the authority of a United States
military government in any foreign area until such time as full
governmental powers were actually being exercised by a successor
government which was approved by the President and Congress.
The whole concept of military government is that it shall restore
and maintain law and order until a disrupted civil government can
been made; it still does not provide the touchstone of our inquiry, which is
whether or not Okinawa is a foreign country. That the United States could
at any time set aside Japanese laws does not, as we see it, signify that
Okinawa has lost its foreign character."
' Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 343-44, 348-49 (1952). In upholding the jurisdiction of civilian composed United States occupation courts
in Germany, the Court there stated: "October 20, 1949, following her fatal
shooting of her husband at their residence at Buchschleg, Kreis Frankfurt,
Germany, she was arrested there by the United States Air Force Military
Police. On the following day, before a 'United States Military Government
Court,' she was charged with the murder of her husband in violation of § 211
of the German Criminal Code. In February, 1950, she was tried by 'The
United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany, Fourth
Judicial District. That court was composed of three United States civilians,
two of whom had been appointed as district judges and one as a magistrate
by or under the authority of the Military Governor of the United States
Area of Control. The court adjudged her guilty and sentenced her to 15
years in the Federal Reformation for Women at Alderson, West Virginia,
or elsewhere as the Secretary of the Army might direct. In May, the 'Court
of Appeals of the United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for
Germany,' composed of five United States civilians appointed by the Military Governor of the Area, affirmed the judgment ....

In the absence of

attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it appears that, as
Commander-in-Chief -of the Army and Navy of the United States, he may,
in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of
military commissions, and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions,
in territory occupied by Armed Forces of the United States. His authority
to do this sometimes survives cessation of hostilities. The President has
the urgent and infinite responsibility not only of combating the enemy but
of governing any territory occupied by the United States by force of arms.
The policy of Congress to refrain from legislating in this uncharted area
does not imply its lack of power to legislate."
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be effectively replaced by another civil government in the occupied
area. The flexibility of military government makes it possible to
perform this essential task under highly adverse circumstances when
others cannot or will not discharge this responsibility. The civil
courts have not been disposed to curtail this function in such a
manner as to create a hiatus in time or place where there would be
no responsible governmental authority.
Jus POsTLIMINII
Having first distinguished military government and its law from
its relatives and then pursued it from birth to death one might
suppose the subject closed. Technically this is so, but to disregard
entirely the surviving legal progeny would be a disrespect to the
deceased. Not least of the legal problems resulting from war are
those encountered in adjusting the war-disrupted rights of individuals once peace is restored. This is not merely a latter-day
refinement.
The Institutes of Justinian thus define the doctrine of postliminium as it existed in the Roman law:
5. If a father is taken captive, though he becomes the
slave of his captors, none the less his power over his children
continues to exist owing to the right of postliminium; because
persons taken captive by the enemy, if they return from captivity, recover all their former rights. Accordingly, if he
comes back he will have his children in his power, because the
effect of postliminium is that the person who was taken captive is feigned never to have left the State; but if he dies in
captivity the son is deemed to have been sui juris from the
time when his father was taken captive. Similarly, if it is
a son or a grandson who is taken captive we speak of the
paternal power as in suspense. The word postliminium is
derived from "post" and "limen", and a person who is taken
captive and comes back within the limits of the Empire is
correctly described as returning by postliminium. By "limen"
(threshold) we mean the frontier of a house, and the old
lawyers applied the word to the frontier of the Roman State;
so that the word postliminium conveys the idea of re-crossing
the frontier. If a prisoner is recovered from a beaten foe he
20
is deemed to have come back by postliminium.
...INSTITUTES 1:12:5, as translated in LE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN
LAW

81 (2d ed. 1949).

1962]

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Vattel commences his chapter "Of the Right of Postliminium"

with these words:
The right of postliminium is that in virtue of which persons and things taken by the enemy, are restored to their
former state, when coming again under the power of the
nation to which they belonged.
The sovereign is obliged to protect the person and goods
of his subjects, and defend them against the enemy; therefore,
when a subject, or any part of his substance, are fallen into
the hands of the enemy, should any fortunate event bring
them again into the sovereign's power, it is certainly incumbent on him to restore them to their former state; he is to
re-establish the persons in all their rights and obligations, to
give back the effects to the owners; in a word, to settle every
°
thing as they were before they fell into the enemy's hands. T
Originally it seems the doctrine applied only to Romans who
became prisoners of war and who had the successive good fortune
not to be slaughtered on the spot, to escape or be released and thereafter to make their way back to Rome. Vattel extends it to any
subject whose property has come under the control of the enemy.
Hyde points out the general doctrine now applies to the sovereign
as well as individuals. He says:
The doctrine of postliminium signifies broadly that the
mere possession in the course of war of property or territory
of the enemy does not suffice generally to transfer title or
sovereignty as the case may be, as against the enemy owner
or sovereign which regains possession during the conflict.
It doubtless emphasizes the fact that the rights of that owner
or sovereign as such are suspended rather than destroyed by
temporary loss of possession. The principle involved finds
frequent room for application, as where, for example, an invader is driven out of the territory which his forces have
occupied, or when a vessel is recaptured from the enemy.
Even where the enemy taker of possession has also acquired
title, as in the case of movable public property seized by it as
the occupant of a territorial area, the resumption of control
thereof by the belligerent territorial sovereign enables it both
207

VArTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS

458-59 (1805).
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to regain possession and to re-acquire title to the property
concerned ...
When in consequence of a treaty of peace there is a restoration of occupied territory or of other enemy property, that
result must be taken as due to the agreement rather than to
any principle described by the phrase borrowed from the
Roman law. °
The present use of the term as applying to the body of private
law employed to adjust between rights of individuals which have been
affected by the intervening actions of a hostile belligerent occupant
is substantially different from the original concept.2 0 9
Fortunately the jurisprudence of the United States does not
present an abundant literature of the jus postliminii. A condition
precedent to litigation of this nature is normally a substantial
hostile occupation of the territory of the forum productive of the
disruption of private rights for which redress is sought. For this
reason the Philippine Supreme Court has had occasion to deal at
some length with the jus postliminii 1 ° These Philippine decisions,
though an important contribution to international law,2" are beyond
the scope of the present article.
The Civil War cases are of doubtful value here because of the
dual legal status ascribed to the Confederacy of lawful belligerence
on the one hand and sheer rebellion on the other. The acts of
Congress which largely controlled this litigation also curtailed its
precedent value where applied to international belligerent occupation.
Two federal court cases which arose out of the Second World
War give only an inkling of what the United States Supreme Court
2083

HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED

(2d rev.and
ed. 1947).
See Ireland, The Jus Postliminii
the Coming Peace, 18 TUn. L.
REv.210584
(1944).
The more important of these decisions are collected in SALCFDo, IEYES
BY THE UNITED STATES 2419-20
20.

& GLORIA, THE ARMED FORCES AND THE LAW 488-522 (1958).

...
These Philippine decisions are discussed in Lockwood, The Philippine
Supreme Court and Postwar Problems of International Law, 3 STAN. L.
RFv. 3 (1950). No less an authority than Charles Cheney Hyde has disagreed rather vigorously with some conclusions reached by the Philippine
Supreme Court. Hyde, Concerning the Haw Pia Case, 24 PHIL. L.J. 141
(1949). See also Agabayani, Gancayco & Zaballero, The Validity of the
Acts of the Government During the Japanese Occupation, 22 PHIL. LJ. 17
(1947); Feliciano, The Belligerent Occupant and the Returning Sovereign:
Aspects of the Philippine Law of Belligerent Occupation, 28 PHIL. L.J. 645
(1953); Fraleigh, The Validity of Acts of Enemy Occupation Authorities
Affecting Property Rights, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 89 (1949).
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might do with the jus postliminii. In one212 of these, the defendant
Price, a national bank examiner employee of the United States
attached to the Philippine High Commission, was captured by the
Japanese in 1942 in Manila and interned at Santo Tomas University. While there Price made underground arrangements to borrow
from Aboitiz and Company, a banking concern, Japanese occupation
currency, which he used to bribe guards and purchase food from
outside sources to supplement the scant diet. For these funds, Price
gave a series of unsecured non-interest bearing notes repayable, at
the option of the payee, in Japanese pesos or United States dollars
at a fixed exchange rate of two for one. Suit was brought on these
notes in Utah in 1951. Price resisted payment asserting two inconsistent defenses: first, that since it was a war of aggression all
Japanese occupation acts, including the issuance of currency, were
illegal and occupation currency did not constitute a legal consideration for the notes; second, that if Japanese occupation acts were
lawful, a Japanese occupation law made it illegal for persons outside
to traffic in money with internees under penalty of death, and this
made the transaction unenforceable. The federal district court enforced the notes. As to the defendant's contentions, it held that the
issue of currency by a belligerent in occupied territory is legal, but
that the prohibition against loans to internees was violative of the
Hague Conventions and hence would not be enforced or given legal
effect. It has been pointed out that as the international law then
stood, the prohibition against intercourse with internees, though of
a political nature in furtherance of the occupation, was not illegal
while the occupation lasted, but that such law would be given no
effect by the United States courts when asserted after the termination of the occupation. 213 This case was not appealed.
The other case214 involved title to bearer bonds issued by United
States railroad companies and held by private owners in the Netherlands. Immediately upon the German invasion, Queen Wilhelmina
established the Netherland Government-in-exile which the United
States recognized. That government by decree vested protective
title in itself to all securities belonging to persons domiciled in the
212Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602
213 Comment, 50 Micr. L. REv. 1066, 1082

(D. Utah 1951).

(1952).

This view concurs

with the decision reached by the Philippine Supreme Court in Peralta v.

Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285, 42 O.G. 198 (1945), and Alcantara v.
of Prisons, 75 Phil. 494, 42 O.G. 482 (1945).
Director
"1I The Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Netherlands to conserve the owners' rights. Thereafter, in 1941,
a German ordinance compelled Jewish residents to deposit their
assets at a designated office. Agents of the German government
liquidated these assets, including the bonds in suit, on the Paris
black market. A Swiss firm acquired the bonds and in 1946 in
Switzerland sold them to an American who brought them to the
United States in violation of federal foreign fund regulations. Under
Treasury regulations the bonds were deposited with the Federal
Reserve Bank. Both the Netherlands government and the American purchaser asserted title to the bonds. After finding that the
purchaser was not a holder in due course, the district court denied
both claims and ordered the bonds returned to the Federal Reserve
Bank for appropriate distribution. On appeal it was held that the
decree of the Netherlands Government-in-exile did not conflict with
any legitimate legislation or regulation of the belligerent occupant,
nor with the public policy of the forum and so would be enforced.
The court of appeals in awarding the bonds to the Netherlands
government pointed out that article 46 of the Hague Convention
prohibited confiscation of private property by the occupant and that
the Netherlands' decree was directed to impeding such illegal seizure
and implemented a legal restriction already imposed upon the occupant rather than interfering with his legitimate rule.
It is necessary for the forum in jus postliminii cases to characterize the laws of a belligerent occupant or of a government-in-exile
before applying the international conflict of law rule of the forum.
It seems reasonable in either case that the initial test should be, does
the law in question comply with or violate the international law of
belligerent occupation? If a violation it should not be given effect.
If a compliance, but of a character designed primarily to aid the
political objectives of the occupant, since it was valid law during the
occupation its consequences at that time may well be recognized,
while the forum as a matter of public policy may refuse to give such
law any validity after the termination of the occupation. If the law
in question, regardless of its source, was not violative of the international law of belligerent occupation and was nonpolitical in nature,
the forum having so classified it should enforce it.215 This approach
21' Cf. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 733 (1868).
The Court in
holding Texas had not lost title to bonds conveyed in 1864 in furtherance of
the war against the Union, said: "[A]cts necessary to peace and good order
among citizens, such for example, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage and the domestic relations, governing the course of descents, regulating
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appears to be valid whether the forum is that of the original sovereign, the former occupant or a third nation. Repeated application
of this technique would further strengthen the effectiveness of the
existing body of the law of belligerent occupation.
THE FUTURE

The nineteenth century produced legally restrained military government by single nations. The first half of the twentieth century
developed military government by allied nations which approached,
if it did not achieve, true international stature. The 1950s ushered
in rudimentary ad hoc United Nations security forces which terminated hostilities where civil governments could not or would not.
Is it too much to hope that the 1960s may bring an integrated truly
international United Nations security force which can provide not
only police action and disarmament inspections where necessary, but
interim United Nations military government in turbulent areas where
civil governments are for the time being unable to maintain law and
order?216 Such action and such government should be available
wherever necessary to preserve the peace, including the reaches of
outer space217 as well as the remotest corners of this earth.
Such controls and such government must certainly be ruled by
law and not by men. The present, broad and widely accepted, legal
base of military government combined with its flexibility and its
characteristic of being able to function under abnormal stresses bespeak its suitability for emergency assignments to restore law and
order. This potent aid to peace should be carefully perfected.
CONCLUSIONS

(1) Military government, though arising out of paramount
force (as has practically every government), immediately becomes a
government of law.
the conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, and providing
remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other similar acts, which
would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in
general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government; and that acts in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United
States, or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens, and other acts of like
nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid."
...CLARK

&

SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW

(2d ed. 1960);

Taubenfeld, InternationalArmed Forces and the Rides of War, 45 Am. J.
INT'L L. 671 (1951).
" JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY (1959); Wurfel, Space Law-Is There Any?, 37 N.C.L. REv.

269 (1959).
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(2) The present international law of military government to a
very large extent has been shaped and developed by the military
government practices of the United States.
(3) The international law of military government is an integral
part of the domestic law of the United States and is enforced by the
United States Supreme Court.
(4) The international law of military government is now accepted as positive binding law by practically all nations.
(5) The present body of law controlling the exercise of military
government is sufficiently detailed and specific to exact from such
governments a high standard of performance and legal accountability.
(6) Military government characteristically fills a gap when civil
governments are unable to function, performs the vital duty of restoring and preserving law and order, and ceases to exist when normal civil processes are restored.
(7) Military government possesses a catholicity and flexibility
which permits it to function under abnormal conditions which destroy
or disrupt civil governments.
(8) Military government and its techniques possess high present
potential as a means of collective preservation of the peace both on
earth and in outer space.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APPENDIX I

Articles 65 to 77 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 [1955]
3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3517, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, provide:
ARTICLE 65

The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not
come into force before they have been published and brought to the
knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. The effect
of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive.
ARTICLE 66
In case of a breach of the penal provisions promulgated by it by
virtue of the second paragraph of Article 64, the Occupying Power
may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political
military courts, on condition that the said courts sit in the occupied
country. Courts of appeal shall preferably sit in the occupied country.
ARTICLE

67

The courts shall apply only those provisions of law which were
applicable prior to the offence, and which are in accordance with
general principles of law, in particular the principle that the penalty
shall be proportionate to the offence. They shall take into consideration the fact that the accused is not a national of the Occupying
Power.
ARTICLE 68
Protected persons who commit an offence which is solely intended
to harm the Occupying Power, but which does not constitute an
attempt on the life or limb of members of the occupying forces or
administration, nor a grave collective danger, nor seriously damage
the property of the occupying forces or administration or the installations used by them, shall be liable to internment or simple
imprisonment, provided the duration of such internment or imprisonment is proportionate to the offence committed. Furthermore,
internment or imprisonment shall, for such offences, be the only
measure adopted for depriving protected persons of liberty. The
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courts provided for under Article 66 of the present Convention may
at their discretion convert a sentence of imprisonment to one of
internment for the same period.
The penal provisions promulgated by the Occupying Power in
accordance with Articles 64 and 65 may impose the death penalty
on a protected person only in cases where the person is guilty of
espionage, of serious acts of sabotage against the military installations of the Occupying Power or of intentional offences which have
caused the death of one or more persons, provided that such offences
were punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory in
force before the occupation began.
The death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected
person unless the attention of the court has been particularly called
to the fact that since the accused is not a national of the Occupying
Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance.
In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced against a
protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time
of the offence.
[The only reservation made by the United States to this entire
convention pertains to Article 68. It reads: "The United States
reserves the right to impose the death penalty in accordance with the
provisions of Article 68, paragraph 2, without regard to whether
the offences referred to therein are punishable by death under the
law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation begins." Id.
at 3694.]
ARTICLE

69

In all cases, the duration of the period during which a protected
person accused of an offence is under arrest awaiting trial or punishment shall be deducted from any period of imprisonment awarded.
ARTICLE 70
Protected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted
by the Occupying Power for acts committed or for opinions expressed before the occupation, or during a temporary interruption
thereof, with the exception of breaches of the laws and customs of
war.
Nationals of the occupying Power who, before the outbreak of
hostilities, have sought refuge in the territory of the occupied State,
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shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported from the
occupied territory, except for offences committed after the outbreak
of hostilities, or for offences under common law committed before
the outbreak of hostilities which, according to the law of the occupied
State, would have justified extradition in time of peace.
ARTICLE 71
No sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts of the
Occupying Power except after a regular trial.
Accused persons who are prosecuted by the Occupying Power
shall be promptly informed, in writing, in a language which they
understand, of the particulars of the charges preferred against them,
and shall be brought to trial as rapidly as possible. The Protecting
Power shall be informed of all proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against protected persons in respect of charges involving
the death penalty or imprisonment for two years or more; it shall
be enabled, at any time, to obtain information regarding the state
of such proceedings. Furthermore, the Protecting Power shall be
entitled, on request, to be furnished with all particulars of these and
of any other proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against
protected persons.
The notification to the Protecting Power, as provided for in the
second paragraph above, shall be sent immediately, and shall in any
case reach the Protecting Power three weeks before the date of the
first hearing. Unless, at the opening of the trial, evidence is submitted that the provisions of this Article are fully complied with,
the trial shall not proceed. The notification shall include the following particulars:
(a) description of the accused;
(b) place of residence or detention;
(c) specification of the charge or charges (with mention of the
penal provisions under which it is brought) ;
(d) designation of the court which will hear the case;
(e) place and date of the first hearing.
ARTICLE 72
Accused persons shall have the right to present evidence necessary to their defence and may, in particular, call witnesses. They
shall have the right to be assisted by a qualified advocate or counsel
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of their own choice, who shall be able to visit them freely and shall
enjoy the necessary facilities for preparing the defence.
Failing a choice by the accused, the Protecting Power may provide him with an advocate or counsel. When an accused person
has to meet a serious charge and the Protecting Power is not functioning, the Occupying Power, subject to the consent of the accused,
shall provide an advocate or counsel.
Accused persons shall, unless they freely waive such assistance,
be aided by an interpreter, both during preliminary investigation and
during the hearing in court. They shall have the right at any time
to object to the interpreter and to ask for his replacement.
ARTICLE 73

A convicted person shall have the right of appeal provided for
by the laws applied by the court. He shall be fully informed of his
right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within which he may
do so.
The penal procedure provided in the present Section shall apply,
as far as it is applicable, to appeals. Where the laws applied by the
Court make no provision for appeals, the convicted person shall have
the right to petition against the finding and sentence to the competent authority of the Occupying Power.
74
Representatives of the Protecting Power shall have the right to
attend the trial of any protected person, unless the hearing has, as
an exceptional measure, to be held in camera in the interests of the
security of the Occupying Power, which shall then notify the Protecting Power. A notification in respect of the date and place of
trial shall be sent to the Protecting Power.
Any judgment involving a sentence of death, or imprisonment
for two years or more, shall be communicated, with the relevant
grounds, as rapidly as possible to the Protecting Power. The notification shall contain a reference to the notification made under
Article 71, and, in the case of sentences of imprisonment, the name
of the place where the sentence is to be served. A record of judgments other than those referred to above shall be kept by the court
and shall be open to inspection by representatives of the Protecting
Power. Any period allowed for appeal in the case of sentences
ARTICLE
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involving the death penalty, or imprisonment of two years or more,
shall not run until notification of judgment has been received by the
Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 75

In no case shall persons condemned to death be deprived of the
right of petition for pardon or reprieve.
No death sentence shall be carried out before the expiration of
a period of at least six months from the date of receipt by the Protecting Power of the notification of the final judgment confirming
such death sentence, or of an order denying pardon or reprieve.
The six months period of suspension of the death sentence herein
prescribed may be reduced in individual cases in circumstances of
grave emergency involving an organized threat to the security of
the Occupying Power or its forces, provided always that the Protecting Power is notified of such reduction and is given reasonable
time and opportunity to make representations to the competent
occupying authorities in respect of such death sentences.
ARTICLE

76

Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the
occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences
therein. They shall, if possible, be separated from other detainees
and shall enjoy conditions of food and hygiene which will be sufficient to keep them in good health, and which will be at least equal
to those obtaining in prisons in the occupied country.
They shall receive the medical attention required by their state
of health.
They shall also have the right to receive any spiritual assistance
which they may require.
Women shall be confined in separate quarters and shall be under
direct supervision of women.
Proper regard shall be paid to the special treatment due to minors.
Protected persons who are detained shall have the right to be
visited by delegates of the Protecting Power and of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 143.
Such persons shall have the right to receive at least one relief
parcel monthly.
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ARTICLE 77

Protected persons who have been accused of offences or convicted by the courts in occupied territory, shall be handed over at the
close of occupation, with the relevant records, to the authorities of
the liberated territory.
APPENDIX II

The DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE paras. 370-74, at 142-43 (1956), implement article 64 of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3517,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, as follows:
370. Laws in Force. In restoring public order and safety, the
occupant will continue in force the ordinary civil and penal (criminal) laws of the occupied territory except to the extent it may be
authorized by Article 64, GC (par. 369), and Article 43, HR (par.
363), to alter, suspend, or repeal such laws. .

.

.

These laws will

be administered by the local officials as far as practicable. Crimes
not of a military nature and not affecting the occupant's security are
normally left to the jurisdiction of the local courts.
371. Nature of Laws Suspended or Repealed. The occupant may
alter, repeal, or suspend laws of the following types: a. Legislation
constituting a threat to its security, such as laws relating to recruitment and the bearing of arms. b. Legislation dealing with political
process, such as laws regarding the rights of suffage [sic] and
assembly. c. Legislation the enforcement of which would be inconsistent with the duties of the occupant, such as laws establishing
racial discrimination.
372. Prohibition as to Rights and Rights of Action. It is especially forbidden.., to declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible
in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.
373. Suspension of Ordinary Courts. The ordinary courts of justice should be suspended only if: a. Judges and magistrates abstain
from fulfilling their functions .

.

. ; or b. The courts are corrupt or

unfairly constituted; or c. Local judicial administration has collapsed during the hostilities preceding the occupation and the occupant must set up its own courts to ensure that offenses against the
local laws are properly tried. In such cases, the occupant may
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establish courts of its own and make this measure known to the
inhabitants.
374. Immunity of Occupation Personnel from Local Law. Military and civilian personnel of the occupying forces and occupation
administration and persons accompanying them are not subject to
the local law or to the jurisdiction of the local courts of the occupied
territory unless expressly made subject thereto by a competent officer
of the occupying forces or occupation administration. The occupant
should see to it that an appropriate system of substantive law applies
to such persons and that tribunals are in existence to deal with civil
litigation to which they are parties and with offenses committed by
them.

